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INTRODUCTION
Rational choice analysis of law and norms has, to date, yielded
several important insights.1 One might be termed the 4substitution
hypothesis": legal and norm-based rules are alternative means of
social control, and game theory reveals the conditions under which
one mechanism governs behavior to the exclusion of the other.
2
That law and norms are alternatives is an old point.- What rational
choice adds to this insight is some detail about the strategic
problems social control mechanisms solve, the incentives individuals
face for complying with law or norms, and therefore, a basis for
comparing the likely influence of law or norms in a given situation.
Robert Ellickson's work, for example, demonstrates the analysis in
the context of disputes between neighbors: because property norms
solve certain collective action problems, legal rules are not necessary
to solve the same problems.
4
' Rational choice theorists in a variety of disciplines have recently taken up the
phenomenon of norms, attempting to use economically inspired models to explain
the origin and function of norms. See, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF
SOCIAL THEORY, chs. 10, 11, 30 (1990); ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS,
CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE (1986); EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALxT, THE EMERGENCE OF
NORMS (1977); Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1095 (1986); Michael Hechter, The Attainment of Solidarity in Intentional
Communities, 2 RATIONALITY & Soc'Y 142 (1990); Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa:
Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 ETHICS 725 (1990). Jon Elster, on the other hand,
uses rational choice concepts in some respects but defines norms as motivations that
are not outcome-oriented. SeeJON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 97-99 (1989).
Within legal scholarship, the seminal work is ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT
LAw: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
2 See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 123-36, 167-83,249-58 (discussing different
sources of social control, the different sanctions each controller uses to enforce its
rules, and the conditions determining the relative effectiveness of legal and norm-
based rules).
For recent examples outside of rational choice theory, see DONALD BLACK, THE
BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1976); Donald T. Campbell, Legal and Primary-Group Social
Controls, 5 J. Soc. BIOLOGICAL STRUCTURES 431, 434 (1982).
4 Indeed, where legal rules overlap with governing norms, the legal rules may be
GROUP NORMS, GOSSIP, AND BLACKMAIL
Other rational choice/norms scholars assert what might be
termed the "norm governance" hypothesis: Legal rules can shape
norms, and the state should cautiously use legal rules to facilitate or
obstruct specific norms.5 Thus, Robert Cooter advocates, in certain
circumstances, directly incorporating the otherwise underenforced
norms of an industry into legal rules governing contractual relations
in that industry.' Conversely, certain legal rules may efficiently
interfere with dysfunctional norms, as one may regard antidis-
crimination laws as usefully impeding enforcement of discriminatory
norms.7 But legal rules may also inefficiently interfere with norms,
if for example, the law fails to give adequate weight to informal
dispute resolution systems.8
ignored. See ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 40-81 (discussing the lack of influence of
legal rules in disputes regarding cattle trespass and boundary fences). On the other
hand, where the conditions are not appropriate for norms, legal rules still govern the
relevant conduct. See id. at 82-103 (discussing the dominant influence of legal rules
in disputes regarding highway collisions involving livestock). Thus, Ellickson rejects
the extreme law-and-society claim that norms determine behavior to the exclusion of
law ("legal peripheralism") and the extreme law-and-economics claim that law
determines behavior to the exclusion of norms ("legal centralism"), and focuses on
which "controller" is more powerful in particular contexts. See id. at 137-55.
'There is no necessary tension between norm governance and the substitution
hypothesis. Game theory identifies situations where desirable norms fail to arise or
are underenforced; the state may then use law not merely to replace, but to
strengthen norms. Game theory also identifies situations where undesirable norms
arise; the state may then use law to impede norm enforcement.
" See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996)
[hereinafter Cooter, Decentralized Law]; Robert D. Cooter, StructuralAdjudication and
the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215
(1994) [hereinafter Cooter, Structural Adjudication].
7 See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Competition and Race Discrimination, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1003, 1064-71, 1083
(1995) (concluding that "government should obstruct" socially destructive group
norms such as those underlying race discrimination); cf. Mary Anne C. Case,
Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law
and FeministJurisprudence, 105 YALE LJ. 1, 68 (1995) (advocating use of Title VII to
protect effeminate men because "one of the most effective ways to improve the value
of something coded feminine.., is to make it accessible to and acceptable in men");
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2035
(1996) (defending the use of law to undermine dysfunctional norms promoting
dangerous behaviors such as smoking and unsafe sex).
s See e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Searchfor Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1788 (1996) ("[R]ational
transactors might deliberately leave aspects of their contracting relationship to be
governed, in whole or in part, by extralegal commitments and sanctions."); Eric A.
Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on
Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 133, 159-60 (1996) ("[W]ealth-maximizing courts
should defer to groups' resolutions of internal disputes, just as courts in the
2239
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The broad purpose of this Article is to illustrate more complex
connections between law and norms by complicating the norm
governance and substitution hypotheses. My focus is the intersec-
tion between group norms and the law of informational blackmail.'
This intersection is important to both hypotheses. First, the
prohibition on blackmail illustrates a more universal type of norm
governance. Rather than use law to shape a particular norm, as
contract doctrine implements industrial norms or Title VII obstructs
discrimination norms, the blackmail ban affects norms "across the
board." The state's decision to permit or prohibit blackmail turns
out to be an important background determinant of the strength and
content of the group norms in society. In this sense, some norm
governance is inevitable; even if the state chooses not to shape
particular norms, its decision concerning certain behavior, such as
blackmail, affects norms generally. The blackmail ban also
illustrates a more complex substitution hypothesis. Instead of
choosing between a legal and a norm-based rule, the blackmail ban
is a case where society has chosen between two bundles of legal and
norm-based rules. The efficiency of our current regime depends on
how the existing bundle-a legal ban on blackmail combined with
certain informational norms-compares to the alternative bundle-a
legal right to blackmail combined with the different informational
norms that would arise in such a setting.
More narrowly, this Article advances two claims, one positive
and one normative. Part I advances the positive claim that
blackmail affects the enforcement and content of group norms.
Blackmail has certain offsetting effects on the expected cost of
violating norms, impedes the internalization of norms, and
undermines the communication processes that refine and reform
norms. Part II offers the normative claim: that consideration of
norms reveals a new justification for the prohibition of blackmail.
Here, I first assume the validity of an existing economic theory of
the blackmail ban, subject to a particular criticism concerning a
subset of blackmail that has been termed "opportunistic."" Part
administrative law context defer to agency determination.").
' By "informational" blackmail, I mean extortion where the threat is to disclose
information that is embarrassing or damaging to the victim (rather than to do
something else against the victim's interests). See infra text accompanying note 18.
" SeeJames Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 670,
690 (1984) (adopting the term "opportunistic blackmail" to refer to blackmail where
the information the blackmailer threatens to disclose was obtained unexpectedly or
accidentally, without any investment (citing MIKE HEPWORTH, BLACKMAIL: PUBLICITY
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II offers an explanation for why the ban on opportunistic blackmail
is efficient, thus supplementing existing theory. My claim is that the
regulation of nonproprietary information is necessarily "second-
best," the choice being between a regime banning blackmail and
producing excessive disclosure and a regime permitting blackmail
and producing excessive secrecy. I argue that informational norms
obligating privacy correct the former problem to a greater degree
than informational norms obligating disclosure would correct the
latter.
Before beginning, however, I should make clear the sense in
which I am using certain key terms. I follow many others in using
"group norms" to mean customary patterns of behavior that
individuals within a group feel obligated to follow." And by
"group," I have in mind Ellickson's "close-knit" group: "a social
network whose members have credible and reciprocal prospects for
the application of power against one another and a good supply of
information on past and present internal events." 2 Many groups
in society qualify as close-knit, and the evidence suggests that many
social groups use norms to govern their members' behavior. In his
AND SECRECY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 73-77 (1975))); see also infra notes 84-97 and
accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of justifying a ban on opportunistic
blackmail).
n1 See e.g., Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 6, at 1684-85. Thus, norms are
not merely regularities of behavior, but obligatory regularities, the deviation from
which incurs disapproval and other sanctions. Philip Pettit defines a norm more
carefully:
A regularity, R, in the behavior of members of a population, P, when they
are agents in a recurrent situation, S, is a norm if and only if it is true that,
and it is a matter of common belief that, in any instance of S among members
of P,
1. nearly everyone conforms to R;
2. nearly everyone approves of nearly anyone else's conforming
and disapproves of nearly anyone else's deviating; and
3. the fact that nearly everyone approves and disapproves on this
pattern helps to ensure that nearly everyone conforms.
Pettit, supra note 1, at 751.
12 ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 181. See generally id. at 177-82 (discussing the
meaning and consequence of a group being "close-knit"). The "prospect of
unavoidable future encounters" among a cluster of people gives them the ability to
sanction each other; communication supplies members with information constituting
the reputation of other members, which permits decisions about whether and what
sanctions will be applied. Ellickson says the "vagueness" of his definition "is
unavoidable" because "social environments are too rich to be described in terms of
a few quantifiable variables?' Id. at 178. He perceives the relationship between
norms and close-knittedness to be continuous: "the more close-knit a group is, the
better it will be able to use its informal-control system .... " Id. at 177 n.35.
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study, Ellickson found that ranchers in Shasta County, California
controlled the resolution of property disputes concerning cattle
trespass and boundary fences not through law but with norms.
13
The ranchers were connected by both occupation and geography,
two elements that are common, though not necessary,14 to norm-
enforcing groups. Steven Cheung, for example, reports that
orchard owners in rural Washington provide bees for pollination of
their own and neighboring orchards according to a norm requiring
a contribution proportionate to the size of one's orchard.15 Elinor
Ostrom describes norms regulating the uses of common pool
resources, such as irrigation water, all over the world.16 Consider-
able study also shows that norms arise in industries and organiza-
tions characterized by repeated interaction among parties. 7
IS See id. at 40-81. Ellickson also recounts how whalers in the 18th and 19th
centuries used norms to resolve disputes over the ownership ofwhales. See id. at 191-
206; see also id. at 218-19 (regarding a similar discussion of Maine lobstermen, based
on JAMES M. ACHESON, TInE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988)).
14 Many close-knit groups are linked only by occupation (for example, law
professors, who interact at conventions, via internet, etc.), only by geography (for
example, a group of long-time neighbors), or only by some interest other than
occupation (for example, members of a common church or synagogue). As Ellickson
notes, "a person can be a member of several close-knit groups simultaneously," and
"a group does not necessarily have to be small to be dose-knit." ELLICKSON, supra
note 1, at 182.
" See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16J.L.
& ECON. 11, 30 (1973).
16 See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); see also ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES,
GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES 283-300 (1994) (discussing norms associated
with the role of groundwater in southern California); Laurence R. Iannaccone,
Sacrifice and Stigma: ReducingFree-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives, 100
J. POL. ECON. 271,289-90 (1992) (noting the role of norms and stigma in the success
of religious groups).
17 Decades ago, Stewart Macaulay documented business norms in Wisconsin. See
Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. REV. 55 (1963). Janet Landa and Robert Cooter more recently explained the
existence of "ethnically homogenous middlemen groups," ethnic minorities that tend
to dominate certain industrial niches in a nation, in terms of their superior ability to
use informal sanctions for contract breaches. See Janet T. Landa, A Theoy of the
Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law,
10J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 355-57 (1981) (explaining that a code of ethics, embedded in
kinship/ethnic relations, serves as a substitute for contract law); Robert D. Cooter &
Janet T. Landa, Personal Versus Impersonal Trade: The Size of Trading Groups and
Contract Law, 4 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 15, 21 (1984) (arguing that trading groups
aperform the useful function of facilitating contracts under conditions of uncer-
tainty"); see also EDNA BONACICH &JOHN MODELL, THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF ETHNIC
SOLIDARITY 33 (1980) ("[E]thnic groups are really political-interest groups that are
able to make use of moral and ritual obligations to bind their members to act in the
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Finally, throughout this Article I employ the following short-
hand: "B" is the person who has acquired the information useful
for blackmail, sometimes a blackmailer; "V" is the victim, usually the
person to whom the information pertains; "TP" is the third party (or
parties) potentially interested in the information who does not have
it, often the recipient of the information should B decide to disclose
it.
I. THE EFFECT OF BLACKMAIL ON GROUP NORMS
Most of the existing rational-choice/law-and-norms literature
focuses on legal rules of contract or property. But the criminal
prohibition on blackmail is one of the few legal rules that directly
regulates a mechanism of norm enforcement. The exact definition
varies, but many state statutes closely follow the Model Penal Code
in defining blackmail (a form of extortion or theft) as existing where
one "purposely obtains property of another by threatening to ...
expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt
or ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute."" Hatred,
interests of the group."). Thus, in economies with low quality legal sanctions, those
groups with access to better quality informal sanctions, who can invoke the
cooperative norms of their ethnic group, enjoy a comparative contractual advantage.
Today, a number of contracts scholars point to informal group sanctions as a major
deterrent to contractual breaches and strategic behavior, not merely in economies
with underdeveloped legal systems, but everywhere. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting
Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industly, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (explaining how the contemporary New York diamond
market is regulated by private norms); Posner, supra note 8, at 155 ("When members
of a solidary group transact, norms and non-legal sanctions generally resolve disputes.
When contingencies arise, norms allocate risks and specify means of resolution.
Norms also prohibit bad faith and opportunism. The importance of maintaining a
good reputation and ofavoidingostracism deters improper behavior."); see also Bryan
W. Husted, Transaction Costs, Norms, and Social Networks, 33 Bus. & Soc. 30, 53-55
(1994) (analyzing the relationship of transaction costs, norms, and social networks by
comparing buyer/seller relationships in Mexico and the United States). Other
research suggests that norms arise among groups of employees within a single firm
or institution. See, e.g., Roderick M. Kramer, Cooperation and Organizational
Identification, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND
RESEARCH 244,253-59 (J. Keith Murnighan ed., 1993); Milli Laing, Gossip: Does It Play
a Role in the Socialization of Nues?, 25 IMAGE: J. NURSING SCHOLARSHIP 37, 39-41
(1993); Mike Noon & Rick Delbridge, News from Behind My Hand. Gossip in
Organizations, 14 ORGANIZATION STUD. 23, 31-34 (1993).
"s MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1985) (Theft by Extortion); see also id. § 212.5
(Criminal Coercion) ("A person is guilty of criminal coercion if, with purpose
unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action to his detriment, he threatens to:
... (c) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or
ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute ... ."). For a review of state
1996] 2243
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contempt, ridicule, and impaired reputation are all possible
sanctions for violating norms.19 The meaning of blackmail is, of
course, not limited to threatening the shame or reputational loss
that occurs for the purpose of enforcing norms. But blackmail
includes threats to invoke these norm enforcement mechanisms.
This Part discusses the effect on group norms of prohibiting
such threats. I begin the analysis with one simple assumption: that
people like to "gossip." People enjoy passing information about
people they know to other people they know. Thus, like other
forms of communication, gossip is a consumption good, a pastime
rather than a burden.20  Whatever the exact boundaries of this
preference, I assume that the fact that another member has violated
a group norm is exactly the kind of interesting information people
within the group will enjoy passing to others.2' Given this assump-
tion, and if blackmail threats are deterred by criminal sanctions, we
can predict what group members will typically do when they
discover that another member has violated a norm: They will
disclose the violation to others and, in short order, the violation will
become known to the group.2 2
statutes, see Lindgren, supra note 10, at 673-80.
" They are what Cooter terms "cheap pain." Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note
6, at 1668.
"0 Sociologists and anthropologists find that a love for gossip is common to many
cultures. "[E]very single day, and for a large part of each day, most of us are engaged
in gossiping. I imagine that if we were to keep a record of how we use our waking-
time, gossiping would come only after 'work'-for some of us-in the score." Max
Gluckman, Gossip and Scandal, 4 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 307, 308 (1963). For
further discussion, see JORG R. BERGMANN, DISCREET INDISCRETIONS: THE SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION OF GOSSiP (1993); GOOD GOSSIP (Robert F. Goodman & Aaron Ben-
Ze'ev eds., 1994); RALPH L. RoSNOW & GARY A. FINE, RUMOR AND GOssIP (1976);
PATRICIA M. SPACKS, GossiP (1985); Sally E. Merry, Rethinking Gossip and Scandal, in
1 TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 271 (Donald Black ed., 1984).
21 See Noon & Delbridge, supra note 17, at 30-31 (discussing factors that affect
whether and how particular gossip is transmitted). After all, what we mean by a
"close-knit" group is one in which "the information pertinent to informal control
circulates easily among [members]." ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 177-78. Circulation
is not, however, strictly necessary for all norms. Some behavior-the clothing one
wears, for example-may be so public that such norms are easily enforced even if no
one discloses to others when they observe a violation. But it is rare that everyone in
the group directly observes a violation; thus, norm enforcement is usually enhanced
if observers also disclose the violation to others who can also sanction the violator.
Where discovery is rare, gossip may be necessary to the existence of the norm. See
Gluckman, supra note 20, at 312-15; A.L. Epstein, Gossip, Norms, and Social Networks,
in SOCIAL NETWORKS IN URBAN SITUATIONS 117 (J. Clyde Mitchell ed., 1969).
"Disclosure is not guaranteed. Even without blackmail, the discoverer of the
violation will in some cases have selfish reasons for concealing the information. For
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Legalizing and enforcing blackmail contracts, however, will
reduce the level of gossip about norm violations." Absent crimi-
nal sanctions, blackmail will increase.14 Thus, rather than gossip,
group members who discover norm violations will sometimes
conceal their information in order to blackmail the norm viola-
tor.25 Restricting information flow in this manner would affect
group norms in three ways. First, legalizing blackmail would change
the sanction a group member expects to receive for violating a
example, he may fear retaliation by the norm violator. But disclosure is the common
result.
" In theory, the state could decriminalize blackmail but not enforce blackmail
contracts. In evaluating the effect of legalization, however, I assume that blackmail
contracts would be enforceable. Even if they were not, decriminalization would itself
raise the expected returns of blackmail, increasing its quantity and producing the
effects discussed in this Part.
24 See Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 562 (1983)
(noting that after legalization, "there would.., be an open and public market for a
new set of social institutions to exploit the gains from" blackmail). Given the
existence of norms, this claim is contestable. There are norms against blackmail, and
it is conceivable that the norms are so powerful and stable that the removal of
criminal sanctions would not affect the quantity of blackmail. But it is highly
probable that blackmail would substantially increase. The private gain from other
property crimes, such as theft, is often sufficiently large that norm sanctions are
inadequate deterrents, especially for those who take property from victims outside
their social groups. Unlike conventional theft, where the victim is likely to announce
the violation of an antitheft norm, the blackmail victim is likely to conceal his
blackmailer's norm transgression, so as to preserve the secret for which he is being
blackmailed. Thus, norms are less able to deter blackmail than simple theft. Absent
substantial criminal penalties, the expected return from blackmail is likely to be
positive in many cases.
Moreover, the reported cases of blackmail prosecutions demonstrate that norms
are not always sufficient to deter blackmail. See Richard A. Posner, Blackmai Privacy,
and Freedom of Contract, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1817, 1841-47 (1993) (finding 124
published opinions involving a "blackmail" prosecution in this century). Although
such prosecutions are relatively rare, their scarcity does not imply that criminal
sanctions are unimportant. As Posner explains, id. at 1837-40, the blackmail
prohibition works primarily by arming victims with a potent counterthreat: "Expose
my secret and I'll expose your blackmail." Thus, Posner concludes that reported
cases are relatively rare because, given criminal sanctions, successful blackmail is
relatively rare. See id. at 1841. I further discuss the weaknesses of antiblackmail
norms in infra note 126.
2
1 One might respond that legalizing blackmail would not decrease disclosure, but
would merely increase the price paid for disclosure. Those who value the information
could pay for it, and they would pay if they valued disclosure more than the victim
valued secrecy. This solution, however, usually fails. As I explain in considerable
detail, a blackmailer faces far lower transaction costs in dealing with the traditional
victim-who already knows the secret-than with those who would value the
information if they knew of its existence-that is, the other group members. See infra
notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
1gg6] 2245
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norm. Second, blackmail would impede the internalization of
norms because internalization partly depends on the public
punishment of norm violators. Third, blackmail would also inhibit
the public communication processes that work to refine norms and
to reform dysfunctional norms.
A. Blackmail Ambiguously Affects the Expected
Cost of Norm Violations
A rational group member will violate a norm when the expected
benefit exceeds the expected cost. The expected cost of violating
a norm depends on the probability of detection and the sanction
cost the member will bear if detected. Thus, an individual violates
a norm only when b is greater than P(sc), where b is the individual's
private benefit from violating the norm, sc is the sanction cost the
individual will bear if his violation is detected, and P is the probabil-
ity of detection by at least one person.2" The effect of legalizing
blackmail is ambiguous because it would likely increase P but
decrease sc.
First, for obvious reasons permitting blackmail would increase
P. The opportunity for blackmail creates a pecuniary return on
investments in information about norm violations. In at least some
cases, probably most, the pecuniary return will exceed the value an
individual places on gossiping about such information. Thus,
individuals will invest more heavily in discovering norm viola-
tions,27 and the probability of detecting a violation will rise.
Second, blackmail would effectively decrease sc, by replacing it
with a lower blackmail price. Without a blackmail opportunity,
when an individual discovers that a fellow group member has
violated a norm, he is likely to circulate that discovery through
gossip. A blackmail contract suppresses the gossip that would
enable the rest of the group to sanction the violator. A blackmail
transaction replaces the sanction cost-sc-with a blackmail price-bp.
If bp is equal to sc, then the substitution does not change the
2' This statement is not always correct. If an individual has "internalized" the
norm, see infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text, then he will suffer some cost-
guilt-even if his violation is not detected. But I defer discussing how blackmail
affects internalization until Part LB and focus here on how blackmail affects external
sanctions. Even when a group member has internalized a norm, he will violate it if
the benefits exceed the internal costs plus the expected external sanction.
" Many scholars have made this point in the context of crime. The most
elaborate analysis appears in Jennifer G. Brown, Blackmail As Private Justice, 141 U.
PA. L. REv. 1935, 1943-49 (1993).
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expected cost of violating the norm. But I argue that, on average,
bp is less than sc. Thus, blackmail lowers the severity of the average
sanction imposed on those whose norm violations are discovered.
21
The first reason V will pay B less than sc is that the two parties
will negotiate between sc and B's lower reservation price. Ex ante,
there is no reason for V to pay more than sc to avoid incurring sc;
29
therefore, bp can be anywhere between V's and B's reservation
prices. B's reservation price is likely to be quite low, much lower
than V's reservation price."0 The outcome of bargaining is partly
a function of the differing ability of the parties to perceive each
other's reservation price and to misrepresent their own. If skills are
randomly distributed, the average outcome may be quite a bit below
5c.
31
Wealth constraints provide a second reason that bp is less than
sc. Sometimes V will simply lack the wealth to pay a blackmail price
equivalent to sc. For many norm violations the sanctions may be
modest, and the likelihood that V cannot pay sc is low. But for
norms that may be the most important to the group's welfare-the
group's core norms-the sanction may include social and economic
ostracism. With these sanctions, it is more likely that V cannot pay
sc, and consequently that bp is less than sc. Thus, blackmail will
lower the cost of violating the group's most important norms. For
28 If the norm violation is also a crime, V will commit the violation only if b >
P(sc + cp), where cp is the criminal punishment. The arguments I make for why bp <
sc also explain why bp < sc + ep. Cf. Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and
TheirIllegality: Blackmai4 Extortion, andRobbery, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1877, 1882 (1993)
(arguing that when a victim seeks to conceal criminal activity, the blackmail price will
tend to be lower than the punishment the victim will otherwise face).
The possibility that others besides B may discover V's secret and either disclose
it or demand a blackmail price does not mean that V will pay more, on average, than
sc. V will tend to discount the value of B's promise not to disclose by the probability
that others besides B might disclose. Consequently, the possibility of independent
discovery should not systematically affect the relative values of sc and bp. For
example, if there is a 10% chance of independent discovery and disclosure, Vwill not
pay B more than 0.9sc. Suppose V pays B 0.9sc and that the independent discoverer
discloses V's norm violation. In one out of 10 cases, V bears a cost of 1.9sc, while in
nine out of 10 cases, V bears a costs of 0.Qsc. The average is still 1.0sc.
" B's reservation price is often just the value he places on disseminating the
information through gossip. There is not likely to be any pecuniary return to B for
his gossip. See infra notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
s" Note the asymmetry: When V is the superior bargainer, he will pay less than
sc, but when B is the superior bargainer, he will not extract more than sc. When B
overestimates V's reservation price and demands a payment higher than sc, V will
refuse to pay; but when B underestimates V's reservation price and demands a
payment lower than sc, V will accept the deal.
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these two reasons, the blackmail price will, on average, fall below
the value of the norm sanction.
3 2
Thus, legalizing blackmail appears to increase the likelihood that
someone will detect a norm violation, but appears to decrease the
costs the violator incurs once his transgression is detected. The net
effect on norm enforcement is indeterminate.33 For some particu-
12 There is possibly a third reason. Vwill pay B less than sc if he believes B might
avoid full liability for breaching his promise not to disclose V's secret. For example,
if V believes he cannot adequately prove his full damages, nor be certain a court will
enforce a liquidated damages provision, then he may fear that B will subsequently
threaten to breach the contract unless paid further sums. Even if V can prove
damages, he may fear that B lacks the wealth to pay them. If V is unsure whether B
would pay all of V's damages (equal to sc) upon breach, V will accordingly discount
the value of B's promise.
These administrative costs will be reduced, possibly to a negligible level, if the
legalization of blackmail creates a large blackmail industry, what Richard Epstein has
labeled "Blackmail, Inc." Epstein, supra note 24. In such an industry, firms would
compete to establish reputations for keeping their promises and threats-for
concealing secrets (without further demands) when paid the blackmail price and
disclosing secrets otherwise. With perfect information about these reputations, V
would have no reason to expect that Blackmail, Inc. would breach its promise or be
unable to pay damages if it did. When someone not in the business discovered
information suitable for blackmail, he would maximize his return by selling the
information to Blackmail, Inc., which would actually make the contract with V.
Reputational information is, however, not perfect. Moreover, where an
"amateur" sells his secret discovery to Blackmail, Inc., the firm will face the same
difficulties discussed above in preventing the amateur from disclosing the secret or
selling it again: Blackmail, Inc. may not be able to prove its full damages or recover
the damages it can prove. Blackmail, Inc. would often have reasons not to disclose
its informational source to V, so even when one of its professional agents obtained
the information, V will worry that the source is a less controllable amateur. Thus,
these administrative problems may provide another reason that the amount V pays
B (even Blackmail, Inc.) will fall below sc.
" The indeterminacy is more severe because of additional effects not discussed
in the text. For example, by decreasing gossip, blackmail may in one way decrease the
probability of detection. I have in mind situations where discovering a norm violation
requires interpreting ambiguous information. Suppose 0 observes group member V
behave furtively or erratically. Absent the opportunity for blackmail, 0 will share this
information with other group members through gossip. By combining data, the
group mayjointly discern norm violations no individual would have discovered. The
opportunity to blackmail, however, creates an incentive not to share information.
Each individual will hold back his suspicions in the hope of independently discovering
evidence of a norm violation that will allow him alone to blackmail V. Group
discovery forces one to share blackmail proceeds with others or, if the discovery is
widespread, eliminates blackmail leverage entirely. Legalizing blackmail thus creates
a collective action problem: the group benefits if individuals share their knowledge,
but each individual now benefits from hoarding information.
There is also a way in which allowing blackmail would increase the sanction for
violating norms. When the discoverer of a norm violation is not a member of the
norm violator's group, he may detect the violation, but he is not likely to gossip. As
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lar groups or particular norms, it might be possible to speculate
productively as to which effect dominates. 4 But I have little basis
for guessing whether the blackmail ban, on the whole, increases or
decreases the expected cost of violating group norms.3 5  The
remaining effects, however, are more definitive.
B. Blackmail Impedes the Internalization of Norms
Assume that we cannot predict how blackmail changes the
expected cost of violating norms. We still know that the cost the
norm violator bears is incurred publicly when it takes the form of a
reputational loss, but privately when it takes the form of a blackmail
payment. Blackmail drives the punishment of norm violators
"underground." In this section and the next, I attempt to predict
the consequences of this change. My claim here is that blackmail
impedes the internalization of norms.
Many theorists note that norms may arise from the "internaliza-
tion" of external standards of behavior s6 To say the norm is
a general rule, people do not gossip about strangers or with strangers. People gossip
with people they know about other people they know, usually when the gossip
recipient also knows the subject of the gossip. See BERGMANN, supra note 20, at 67
("[T]he subject of gossip must be an acquaintance of the gossip recipient or at least
be known to him indirectly through intermediaries or local 'fame,' because the news
he hears is personally relevant for him only if it is not about a complete stranger.");
Sally Yerkovich, Gossiping As a Way of Speaking, J. COMM., Winter 1977, at 192, 196
("Information, no matter how salient or scandalous, isn't gossip unless the
participants know enough about the people involved to experience the thrill of
revelation."). With extragroup discovery, sc is effectively zero. Thus, in this situation,
the blackmail transaction replaces zero punishment with a blackmail price. Permitting
blackmail gives strangers an incentive to use negative information they discover-that
is, to blackmail-in situations where they have no incentive to gossip.
Suppose, for example, that without blackmail, P is already very high (near 1.0).
It might still be the case that the norm is underenforced if b is sometimes higher than
sc. In this case, there are two reasons to think that permitting blackmail will have
very little positive effect on P. First, there is little reason to invest in discover-
ing violations that are already nearly certain to be discovered; the expected
blackmail return is low. Second, when P is quite high, it can only increase so much.
In this circumstance, the decrease in sc may dominate. We might predict that
permitting blackmail would reduce the expected cost of violating those norms in
which the probability of detection is already high. Cf supra note 32 and accompany-
ing text (arguing that the decrease in sc is greatest for the group's most important
norms).
" With risk aversion, one could assert that an increase in P and an equiva-
lent decrease in sc would decrease norm compliance because risk is reduced. But
there is still no way of knowing that the increase in P is "equivalent" to the decrease
in sc.
' See Robert D. Cooter, Law and Unified Social Theory, 22 J.L. & Soc'Y 50, 63
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internalized is to say that the individual has developed a preference
for behaving as the norm requires and suffers some psychic cost-
"guilt" or "shame"-from behaving otherwise.-7 Robert Cooter uses
signaling theory to construct a rational choice model of internaliza-
tion. According to Cooter, when a group faces a collective action
problem, some of its members recognize and signal to others the
collective benefits of cooperation."8 The resulting "endorsement
of cooperation" is "unanimous" because no one gains by defending
the strategy of defection; even those intending to defect will publicly
endorse cooperation. This unanimous "public consensus" causes
people to internalize the norm. 9 Whatever the exact psychology,
Cooter's theory is supported by a long line of "conformity"
experiments in which individuals facing a unanimous group
judgment different from their own tend to conform their expressed
judgment to that of the entire group.40 Sometimes these expressed
judgments mask continued disagreement, but sometimes the
individuals convince themselves that the group is in fact correct.41
(1995) ("[A] customary norm emerges in a community when it is internalized by
enough members.") [hereinafter Cooter, Social Theory]; see also EMILE DURKHEIM, THE
DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 68-87 (W.D. Halls trans., 1984); MAX WEBER, THE
PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITAuSM 27 (Talcott Parsons trans., 1958);
Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique
of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 46 (1989).
.1 See Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 6, at 1665 ("[S]omeone who has
internalized a norm feels guilt from violating it and pride from obeying it.").
38 See id. at 1666.
39 Because norms are internalized only where "private incentives for signaling
align with a local public good," Cooter believes that internalized norms tend to be
efficient. See Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note 6, at 224.
"' For a review of conformity experiments, see Serge Moscovici, Social Influence
and Conformity, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 347, 350 (Gardner
Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 3d ed. 1985) ("Hundreds of experiments have
demonstrated that people can be made to state and to think the opposite of what they
see and believe to be the truth."). As Cooter's model requires, the fact that such
judgments are unanimous is particularly important to measuring a conformity effect.
See id. at 363, 368-70.
41 See id. at 375.
[T]he individual continues to conform somewhat even when he is alone and
anonymous. All in all, there is never mere compliance or mere change in
attitude. And as we know because of the introduction of the cognitive
dissonance theory, a forced compliance may result in an authentic change
in attitude. This change results because individuals try to reduce the
discrepancy between their actions and their thoughts, their public and their
private opinions. Pascal recognized the fact long ago: Pray, and faith will
follow.
Id. at 393.
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Cooter suggests that individuals who internalize a norm are willing
to bear moderate costs to enforce the norm against others.
42
Cooter's model, however, appears to claim that the norm arises
in a single stage-that for any given individual, the unanimous
expression of agreement either causes internalization or it does not.
But if unanimity itself fails to produce universal internalization (as
Cooter seems to think is probable), then perhaps other mechanisms
would come into play. Consider a modification to his model: a
"second stage" in which additional internalization occurs. In the
first stage, some group members internalize the norm and are
willing to bear costs to enforce it. In the second stage, their public
norm enforcement causes other members to internalize the norm. A
signal of public unanimity combined with individuals bearing costs
to enforce the consensus is a stronger signal than public unanimity
alone. Strengthening the signal could "convert" to the norm some
of those who did not internalize it in the first stage. This effect is
particularly likely for children. Public punishment of norm violators
is a vivid means of signaling to children the group's view as to the
wrongfulness of certain conduct. People are particularly subject to
internalization as children, and because children lack the interest or
ability to commit many norm violations, they learn at this critical
stage by observing the punishment of others.4" Even for adults,
public enforcement may be crucial for inculcating new members
with group values."
42 See Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 6, at 1669.
" Sociologist John Braithwaite observes:
Through listening to and participating in secretive gossip directed at others
we learn the circumstances by which people suffer loss of reputation
through gossip.... Children need to learn about the evil of murder, rape,
car theft, and environmental pollution offenses through condemnation of
the local butcher or the far away image on the television screen. But the
shaming of the local offender known personally to children in the
neighborhood is especially important, because the wrongdoing and the
shaming are so vivid as to leave a lasting impression.... The evil of acts
beyond the immediate experience of children is more effectively communi-
cated by shaming than by pure reasoning.
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION 76-78 (1989); see also Gary
A. Fine, Social Components of Children's Gossip, J. COMM., Winter 1977, at 181, 182
("Numerous studies of children have emphasized the large amount of social
conformity that occurs throughout the growing up period. . . . One of the
determinants of this conformity is through the normative regulation of gossip."
(citation omitted)). See generally JEROME KAcAN, THE NATURE OF THE CHILD 145-49
(1984) (discussing how violations of standards result in emotional experiences that
may create internal standards within the child).
41 As one commentators notes:
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The publicity of norm enforcement is especially important when
considering certain obstacles to internalization. The first obstacle
is the "hypocrisy" problem. Cooter's model assumes that in the first
stage there is unanimous public signaling, but not unanimous
behavioral adherence to that signal. In other words, some people
say one thing publicly and do another privately. Perceptions of
widespread hypocrisy may impede internalization. People rational-
ize: Why should I feel guilty when most everyone else does it?45
But public sanctioning of norm violators permits those who have
internalized the norm to demonstrate to those who have not that
some group members consistently endorse the norm and bear costs
to enforce it. Public enforcement may suppress the contrary
hypocrisy signal, causing a new round of internalization to take
place.
Consider a second obstacle to norm internalization-a "rational-
ization" barrier. Like legal rules, some norms are vague. For
example, suppose some people internalize a meta-norm that
commands them to do "their share" in any group endeavor."' On
the one hand, such a norm seems to solve all collective action
problems perfectly (which suggests that it is too good to be true).
On the other hand, the norm is extremely vague. Without a more
A major component of professional socialization is internalization of
the norms and values of the professional and work culture....
Friedson... submits that the use of hearsay, stories and gossip among
professionals is a strong form of social influence. Traditional morals and
ideals can be made public through gossip and stories.... This type of
communal scrutiny and sanctioning also occurs in nursing. During change
of shift report, experienced nurses verbalize their concerns regarding
standards of care, educating neophytes to what is, or is not, acceptable
nursing practice ....
Laing, supra note 17, at 40-41 (citing ELIOT FRIEDSON, DOCTORING TOGETHER: A
STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL CONTROL 142-45 (1980)).
45 See THOMAS GABOR, EVERYBODY DOES IT! CRIME BY THE PUBLIC 183-84 (1994)
(noting that a frequent justification for employee theft is that such conduct is
commonplace).
46 The distinction between norms and meta-norms is a useful one. Internalization
probably occurs at a general level-one is likely to internalize the general obligation
to be a "good friend" or to treat others "fairly" long before internalizing the specific
behaviors that, at a given time and place, are thought to constitute good friendship
or fair treatment. This distinction also reconciles the apparent fluidity of norms with
the stability of internalization. The obligation to "do one's share," to be a "good
friend," or to be "fair" does not change much over time, but the "social meaning" of
each of these obligations does. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of SocialMeaning,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995) (discussing the influences of "social meaning" on
individual behavior).
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specific norm, individuals are free to interpret what "their share" is.
Here is where rationalization can occur (and can explain why the
norm could exist despite free-riding). An individual uses his
interpretive creativity to convince himself that his share is as small
as possible. He invents rationales for why entirely selfish behavior
complies with the norm. Public norm enforcement can undermine
this process of rationalization. Public shaming disrupts the comfort
of these self-indulgent rationalizations. In public confrontation, a
violator can attempt to reduce the sanctions others impose on him
either byjustifying his violation or exhibiting repentance. But norm
enforcers tend to expose mercilessly the self-interested nature of
these rationalizations. The violator-and all those who observe the
shaming ritual-are thus less likely to rely on those rationalizations
again.
Even if these complications are only roughly correct, they
sufficiently illustrate how blackmail would interfere with norm
internalization. In each instance where B blackmails V concerning
his norm violation, there is one less case of public norm enforce-
ment." The fewer instances of public enforcement, the less
frequently and intensely the group signals its disapproval of
violations." Given that norm violations occur, the weaker signal
may ensure that the "hypocrisy" effect will prevent any "stage two"
internalizations.49 Children will witness fewer dramatic examples of
the dire consequences of norm violations and have fewer occasions
to learn by example. Without public enforcement exposing
rationalizations, it will be easier to rationalize selfish conduct as
complying with vague norms.
Finally, public norm enforcement may also cause those being
punished to internalize the norm. John Braithwaite astutely
observes that shaming is a very productive punishment for this
reason. Shaming by one's social network may produce guilt
47 Of course, some norm violations will be discovered simultaneously by such a
large number of people that no opportunity for blackmail will arise. Thus, blackmail
will not eliminate public enforcement. Nonetheless, norm violators will seek to
conceal their violations, so that many discoveries will represent blackmail opportuni-
ties, meaning lost opportunities for public enforcement.
48 Cf. Brown, supra note 27, at 1970-71 (noting that, regarding criminal offenses,
the blackmailer cannot perform the "important task" of "declaring societal norms and
labeling as 'criminal' behavior that runs afoul of them").
' I am assuming that the norm is one in which the existence of violations is
typically public, although the identities of the violators is not. For example, people
know the extent to which others are violating an antilittering norm or a water-
conservation norm, although they do not typically know the identities of the violators.
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mechanisms that control future behavior without external monitor-
ing."o But according to Braithwaite's thesis, shaming can produce
this effect only if it is followed by "reintegration." Shaming works
only to the extent that the shamed individual continues to care
about the favorable opinion of his fellow group members. Unrelent-
ing shame pushes the individual, at least psychologically, out of the
group; over time, he ceases caring about the opinion that those in
the group hold of him. Thus, Braithwaite argues that, except in
extreme cases, successful shaming is accompanied by reintegration
in which a repentant individual is forgiven and prior relations are
resumed. 5'
By rendering impossible the public punishment of a norm
violator, blackmail also removes the opportunity for shame and
reintegration. Of course, without public shaming, there is no need
for reintegration; successful blackmail does not threaten to drive the
individual out of the group. The important question, however, is
which process is more likely to cause a norm violator to internalize
the norm: one where a violator is subject to a shaming ritual,
exhibits repentance, and enjoys reintegration; or one where a
violator pays a blackmail price to keep his violation secret? I think
the question almost answers itself. As stated above, the reason is
that public enforcement often exposes the frailty of the norm
violator's rationalizations, even to the violator.5" With blackmail,
however, only B shares the norm violator's secret. Yet B has no
incentive to puncture the norm violator's rationalizations; he may
prefer that V continue violating the norm and subjecting himself to
further blackmail. Indeed, B may even lack the "moral authority"
to shame V. If B were sufficiently group-regarding, he would
'5 See BRArrHWAITE, supra note 43, at 75. He further notes:
In summary then, shame operates at two levels to effect social control.
First, it deters criminal behavior because social approval of significant others
is something we do not like to lose. Second, and more importantly, both
shaming and repentance build consciences which internally deter criminal
behavior even in the absence of any external shaming associated with an
offense. Shaming brings into existence two very different kinds of
punishers-social disapproval and pangs of conscience.
Id.
51 See id. at 81.
s When confronted by the group, norm violators may realize that what seemed
sound reasoningin private will fail to persuade anyone else. To hasten reintegration,
the violator eventually considers repenting. But the violator will more easily convince
others he is repentant if he really is repentant. Those who achieve genuine remorse
have begun to internalize the norm.
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disclose the violation rather than seeking to benefit privately from
it. The self-serving conduct of the blackmailer may only reinforce
the violator's underlying tendency to rationalize his norm viola-
tions."3 In sum, blackmail diminishes public sanctioning, which in
turn means observers and recipients of the sanctioning are less
likely to internalize the norm.
C. Blackmail Inhibits the Communication Processes
That Refine and Reform Inefficient Norms
If norm violators are blackmailed, another consequence is that
group members will spend less time in self-conscious discussion of
the norm. With fewer cases of public norm enforcement, there is
less occasion to discuss whether an act violates the norm, what the
appropriate punishment is, or whether the norm requires rethink-
ing. In this Section, I argue that intragroup norm discussion
facilitates the efficient development of norms by drawing on two
other examples of self-conscious discussion: common law rule-
making and consumer complaints. Gossip serves to hone norms just
as judicial decisionmaking may refine common law rules and just as
consumer complaints may discipline declining firms.
Even those who claim that norms are generally efficient point
out the ways in which an inefficient norm can arise.' A norm
' It is possible, of course, that the blackmail victim will view his plight as
something he deserves, and blackmail will cause him to feel remorse and internalize
the norm. This result is more likely, however, when the punishment is overt and
communal.
' First, any efficiency claim is merely that the norm benefits the group in which
it arises; thus, it is entirely possible that the norm benefits the group by imposing a
larger cost on another group. See ELLicKSON, supra note 1, at 169 ("[N]orms that add
to the welfare of the members of a certain group commonly impoverish, to a greater
extent, outsiders to that group."); Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note 6, at 225
("Communities often develop norms that benefit their members at the expense of
members of other communities."); McAdams, supra note 7, at 1064-71 (noting that
norms of racial discrimination generate status welfare for the majority group at the
expense of subordinate minority groups). Second, even for the group in which it
arises, if the process of norm change is evolutionary, the norm may only reach a
"local maximum." See Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note 6, at 225. Evolution
occurs incrementally. But if the first few steps toward a global maximum cause a
decline in adaptive fitness (group welfare), then the organisms (here, groups) making
such a change may die out (be abandoned) before they reach the point of increasing
returns. Of course, human groups are not limited to evolutionary change; they may
change their norms consciously, "jumping" from a local to global maximum. But a
nonevolutionary mechanism for producing norms requires information. Individuals
must accurately perceive a harm, its magnitude, and its causes. Otherwise, group
members may enforce a norm that causes rather than corrects the problem, or that
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might be inefficient when it first arises; or a norm suited to certain
conditions may not change as quickly as those conditions change or
may change in the wrong direction. In either case, one may wonder
how an inefficient norm can be changed. Self-conscious discussion
may refine norms to reflect more precisely the group's interests and
reform inefficient norms where they arise.
1. Blackmail Inhibits Gossip-Based Articulation of
Norm Boundaries
First, gossip serves as a way of adjudicating disputes over norm
violations, and this process, in turn, refines the content of norms to
resolve specific concerns.5 As with legal rules, even if one knows
the facts of a situation, there remains the question of applying the
norm to the facts. For some norms, the existence of a violation may
follow uncontroversially from the facts.56 But some norms are
complex; in addition, it is necessary on occasion to resolve a conflict
between norms that may command inconsistent behavior in a
particular case.
57
imposes higher costs than the harm the norm reduces. For a more detailed
discussion of the barriers to norm efficiency, see Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and
Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996).
' See Barbara Yngvesson, The Reasonable Man and the Unreasonable Gossip: On the
Flexibility of (Legal) Concepts and the Elasticity of (Legal) Time, in CROSS-EXAMINATIONS:
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF MAX GLUCKMAN 133, 134 (P.H. Gulliver ed., 1978) ("Gossip
... serve[s] to clarify politically problematic issues and to provide a publicly
acceptable, 'straightforward' explanation of how a breach is to be handled.").
Yngvesson compares the use of courts and gossip to adjudicate disputes and argues
that they differ less than is usually supposed:
All of these procedures-presentation of a case by litigants in court,
disposition of the case by ajudge in court, plea-bargaining over the charge
prior to arraignment or trial, evaluation of a case by a drug screening board,
and gossip in the community-are characterized by a degree of rationality,
to the extent that they are goal-directed and involve fitting unique events
into a more general framework in terms of which these events can be
viewed as 'reasonable' or 'unreasonable.' But the decisions reached surely
are shaped by irrational elements as well, whether they are reached in court
.. or over a coffee table.
Id. at 153-54; see also Noon & Delbridge, supra note 17, at 28 ("A person may gossip
to seek to change group values, thus gossip can assist the individuil to impact upon
the group, and perhaps change its order or structure."). For further discussion of
how individuals attempt to change norms, see Lessig, supra note 46; Allan Gibbard,
Norms, Discussion, and Ritual: Evolutionary Puzzles, 100 ETHICS 787 (1990); Edna
Ullmann-Margalit, Revision of Norms, 100 ETHICS 756 (1990).
6 For example, a religious group's norm bars sex outside of marriage, and the
facts show that two unmarried members had sex.
s7 Suppose, for example, a norm requiring one to contribute a "fair share" to
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Through gossip, the group constructs and articulates the exact
contours of a norm. Like common law courts, gossip applies the
general norm to the particular situation, thereby refining the norm
itself." Blackmail would replace gossip and therefore impede this
process of refinement.59 One might object that, whatever the value
of adjudication, permitting blackmail would merely reduce, not
eliminate, adjudication of norms through gossip. In some cases,
observers of a norm violation would choose to gossip despite
blackmail opportunities; in other cases, so many people directly
observe the violation that there is no opportunity for blackmail. So
the question is the marginal value of each gossip-based adjudication.
The same difficulty arises in trying to determine the "optimal" level
of judicial adjudication: Settlement deprives the courts of an
opportunity to state or restate how the law applies to a set of
facts,6" but we can obtain most of the benefits of this judicial
refinement without having all cases proceed to trial.
public goods, especially in time of emergency-the kind of norm that may explain why
Mississippi River Valley residents constructed sandbag walls during the floods of
1993, despite the apparent incentives to free-ride. Two complications impede the
application of this norm: There are a variety of different tasks that need to be done
and people have a variety of abilities to do them. One imagines the norm is to
contribute something like "a fair share" given one's abilities. In defining their "fair
share," residents must evaluate what others contribute while making accommodations
for each other's physical frailty. Application of the norm is problematic. In addition,
deciding where to pile sandbags may require resolution of conflicting norms, if
different norms favor efforts to save different structures and all norms cannot be
accommodated. The circle of gossip is the "court" in which norm violations are
"tried." Group members use gossip to discover how much work other members did
and also to work out how much work was "enough" under the circumstances.
Members also determine whether decisionmakers correctly resolved conflicts between
competing norms.
' Yngvesson elaborates:
[People use gossip] in situations where rules are ambiguous .... [P]eople
create moral and political rules that are inherently ambiguous and flexible,
and... this characteristic of rules is used in situations where 'real world'
events and actions must be explained andjustified. In courtroom hearings,
the fitting process is done in public .... Gossip does the same thing in
private, and thus is appropriate in cases where the 'fit' between rules and
behaviour may be particularly problematic.
Yngvesson, supra note 55, at 153.
" Cf Brown, supra note 27, at 1971-72 (noting that blackmail deprives society of
criminal prosecutions that help to "clarify" law and identify "laws that may need
modification").
' See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073, 1085 (1984) (arguing
that, by deciding cases, judges "explicate and give force to the values embodied in
authoritative texts such as the Constitution").
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The relationship between gossip and norm refinement is similar:
After some point, there are sharply diminishing marginal returns to
further discussion. The difficulty is determining whether blackmail
would suppress gossip below this point. The comparison to
litigation, however, should not obscure a crucial difference: legal
rules are formal; norms are not. An important judicial opinion is
usually written and published. One opinion may therefore reach a
very large audience (at least through lawyers) and continue to reach
them for many years. The same is not true of a gossip session.
There is no writing, which leaves room for misrecollection and
divergent interpretations. Even if there were a transcript, there
would be no single authoritative session regarding a particular
behavior, nor any single authoritative speaker at a particular session.
Thus, it is quite possible that each gossip session has a value for
refining and articulating the norm that each adjudication does not
have for legal rules. Blackmail could seriously impede this process.
2. Blackmail Inhibits Criticism of Dysfunctional Norms
Beyond refinement, communication may be used to criticize and
"repeal" or reform inefficient norms. Criticism may seem to be an
unlikely source for making norms efficient. As Albert Hirschman
notes in Exit, Voice and Loyalty, economists prefer using the
mechanism of "exit" to explain competition." Although exit is
crucial, Hirschman explained that in conditions of less-than-perfect
competition (for quality), customers will often, at least initially,
complain rather than exit.62 This direct feedback-which he labels
"voice"-can discipline market entities and maintain competition.63
In the context of norms, "voice" means that group members who
are dissatisfied with a norm sometimes complain about it, rather
than immediately exit the group. One person may first acquire the
information that shows the norm to be inefficient; sharing the
information may convince others to abandon or modify the norm.
The process may occur early in norm formation, thus preventing the
group from fully embracing an inefficient norm, or it may occur
61 See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 17 (1970).
62 For example, after a quality decline, consumers will use the "voice" option if
they think that the probability that the producer will return to the preexisting quality
level, times the value they place on that preexisting quality over the next best
alternative, is greater than the costs of exit. See id. at 37-39.
63 See id. at 4.
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later, after changed conditions render an existing norm inefficient
and the critic points out that the old norm no longer serves the
group's interests."'
Blackmail will significantly restrict intragroup criticism of norms.
Initially, note that an individual may bear a cost in criticizing norms.
Most group members are likely to believe the norm serves the
group's interests; some have even internalized the norm. The group
may therefore infer that the critic is attempting to undermine a
norm because he is covertly violating it.' An individual will
criticize a norm when he values the increased probability of
changing the norm more than the increased probability of being
sanctioned.6" Because the probability that any one member's
criticism will change the norm is very low, public criticism of norms
is a public good apt to be undersupplied.67
" See id. at 30. In conformity experiments the power of the group to make others
ago along" dramatically declines if there is a single dissenter from an otherwise
unanimous consensus. See Moscovici, supra note 40, at 363 ("[I]f even one
confederate has been instructed to disrupt the unanimity by giving a different
response, the number of conformist responses drops precipitously.... [U]nanimity
... is more important than the mere number of persons adopting a common
response."). For a discussion of conformity experiments, see supra note 40 and
accompanying text.
s There are other ways to characterize the cost of criticizing a norm. For
example, the critic may be viewed as defending and condoning norm violators,
thereby failing to contribute sufficiently to sanctioning the violation. In other words,
there may be an independent norm against criticism of a certain norm.
" Let A Pr be the change in the probability of reform caused by an individual's
criticism, rb be the benefit the critic would receive from reform, A P, be the change
in the probability of the critic receiving the sanction, and sc be the sanction cost. The
individual will criticize when A P,(rb) > A P,(sc). (For an altruist, rb will include some
or all of the benefit other group members would gain from norm reform. Thus,
altruism increases an individual's willingness to criticize a norm he believes is
inefficient.)
67 Lawrence Lessig has made the same point in greater detail. See Lessig, supra
note 46, at 997-99, 1006-07.
Social meanings act to induce actions in accordance with social norms, and
thereby impose costs on efforts to transform social norms. They present,
then, a particularly harsh collective action problem, for not only is there
little incentive for an individual to contribute to a new collective good,
but there is a punishment-the cost of deviance-for any individual who
wishes to contribute to a new collective good; that is, to a new social
meaning.
Id. at 998. Although groups use norms to induce contributions to public goods,
norms may be ill-suited to ensuring sufficient criticism of norms. There may be a
trade-off between the intensity of norm enforcement and a willingness to listen to
arguments for abandoning norms. Some groups may manage to cultivate tolerance
of norm criticism, but many groups enforce norms with sufficient zeal that criticism
will be risky for the critic and therefore undersupplied.
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With blackmail, an individual deciding whether to criticize a
norm will consider two additional factors: how his criticism
affects the possibility of paying blackmail or receiving blackmail
payments. Consider first the possibility of being blackmailed.
Blackmail will change the benefit of norm criticism if it changes the
expected cost of violating an inefficient norm. If the legality of
blackmail raises (lowers) the expected cost, it would raise (lower) the
benefits of reforming the norm. Part L.A demonstrated that
blackmail has an ambiguous effect on the expected cost of violating
a norm,68 and thus an ambiguous effect on the benefit of reform.
The effect on the costs of criticism, however, is unambiguous. The
possibility for blackmail creates an expectation of profits from
blackmailing others after discovering their norm violations. The
profits create an opportunity cost to reforming inefficient norms.
Thus, the only determinate effect of blackmail is to increase the
costs of norm criticism, lowering the odds of reforming inefficient
norms.
6 9
In theory, norm criticism could be a public "bad" rather than a public good, if
members criticize and "reform" an efficient norm. But even with imperfect
information, I assume sufficient rationality that criticism is much more likely to
change inefficient norms than efficient norms. It is difficult to persuade people that
a norm is contrary to their interests even when it is; people tend to interpret
ambiguous information as supporting their existing beliefs. See THOMAS GILOVICH,
How WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T So: THE FALLIBILrTY OF HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY
LIFE 49-72 (1991). That a norm actually benefits the group will make it even more
difficult to persuade people otherwise.
" Because blackmail raises the probability that a norm violation will be
discovered but lowers the cost the violator incurs upon discovery, the net effect is
indeterminate.
69 Absent blackmail, the individual's expected benefit from reforming a norm is
A P,(rb). See supra note 66. Let k be a multiplier representing the effect of blackmail
on that benefit. The term k is less than 1.0 if the net effect of blackmail is to lower
the expected cost of violating norms and greater than 1.0 if the net effect is to raise
the expected cost. In other words, a member's benefit from reforming an inefficient
norm increases if blackmail makes violating the norm more costly, but decreases if
blackmail makes violating the norm less costly. Absent blackmail, the individual's
expected cost from reforming a norm is A P(sc). Let ub. represent the value of all
future profits an individual expects to receive from blackmailing others who violate
a norm. Thus, the new cost of criticizing the norm is the value of these profits
multiplied by the probability that the individual's criticism will reform the norm and
prevent him from blackmailing violators. So, with blackmail, an individual will now
criticize the norm if A P,(rb)k > A P,(sc) + A P,(nb.). The textual point is that the effect
of blackmail on the benefits of criticism is uncertain, because the value of k may be
greater or less than 1.0, but the effect of blackmail on the costs of criticism is
definitely positive, because 7rb.>,0 . Note that norm criticism will decline even if only
some but not all individuals expect to reap blackmail profits (as would be the case if
some but not all individuals have so internalized a norm against blackmail that they
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Even if we were to assume, contrary to the claim of Part L.A, that
legalizing blackmail would increase the expected cost of violating
norms, legalization would still probably inhibit norm reform.70 By
this contrary hypothesis, the net effect of blackmail on criticism
would depend on the sum of two offsetting effects: (1) legalization
would increase the expected cost of violating norms and therefore
increase the benefit of reforming inefficient norms; and (2)
legalization would create expected profits from blackmailing norm
violators and therefore create costs to reforming even inefficient
norms. The latter result would tend to dominate because of how
the effects are distributed: legalizing blackmail would dispropor-
tionately raise the costs of criticism for those members who are
likely to be the most persuasive norm critics.
To understand the point, consider two simple observations
about signalling and the "persuasiveness" of norm criticism. First,
other things being equal, the perception of sincerity makes criticism
more persuasive. Sincerity does not ensure persuasiveness; group
members will typically think criticism is mistaken. But the percep-
tion of insincerity nearly guarantees unpersuasiveness, so a critical
signal that other members believe to be sincere is more likely to
persuade them. Second, the perceived sincerity of norm criticism
is inversely related to the amount others believe the critic would
personally gain from norm reform. Those who gain the most from
violating a norm will want it "repealed" and will claim it is ineffi-
cient even if they actually believe the norm is beneficial to the
group as a whole. If other group members believe a critic will
substantially gain from norm repeal, they are therefore more likely
to perceive his criticism as being insincere. Conversely, those who
stand to gain the least from norm repeal will be the most persuasive
will forgo any blackmail opportunity).
"'The textual assumption represents the only case in which blackmail
might possibly increase norm criticism. Consider the other two cases. First, assume
blackmail has no net effect on the expected costs of violating norms (that k = 1).
See supra note 69. In this case, the benefits of criticizing a norm are exactly the
same with or without blackmail, but because criticism risks losing future blackmail
profits, blackmail unambiguously decreases criticism of inefficient norms. Second,
assume blackmail decreases the expected costs of violating norms (that k < 1). Here,
blackmail decreases the enforcement of both efficient and inefficient norms.
Because the benefits of norm criticism decline while the costs increase, blackmail
again unambiguously decreases criticism of inefficient norms. The text discusses
the third case, where blackmail increases the expected costs of norm violations
(h > 1).
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critics.71 Their criticism signals that they actually believe the norm
is not beneficial to the group.
Legalizing blackmail would affect the most persuasive critics
differently than the least persuasive critics. Both subgroups would
gain an equal opportunity for blackmailing others for violating
norms; for both, criticizing a norm would risk losing this opportun-
ity. Thus, the marginal costs of norm criticism are the same for each
subgroup. But if legalizing blackmail increases the benefits of norm
reform (again, contrary to Part I.A), the marginal benefits of criticism
would not be equally distributed. Those with the greatest stake in
violating a particular norm would lose the most when the legaliza-
tion of blackmail increases the expected cost of violating the norm;
conversely, when the norm is repealed, this subgroup would gain
the most by eliminating the enhanced norm enforcement that
blackmail made possible. Thus, those who gain the most from
violating a norm-the least persuasive norm critics-will accrue most
of the new benefits of norm repeal. On the other hand, those who
gain the least from violating a norm-the most persuasive critics-will
gain a relatively small fraction of the marginal benefits of repeal.
Because the benefits of criticism differ for these two groups
while the costs are equal, their willingness to criticize the norm will
often differ. The less one gains from violating a norm, the more
likely it is that the marginal costs of norm criticism (foregone
blackmail profits) will outweigh the marginal benefits of criticism.
The converse is true for those who gain the most from violating a
norm. Thus, legalizing blackmail will disproportionately suppress
criticism by those with the least interest in violating a norm, the
criticism other group members are most likely to perceive as being
sincere. To illustrate, if legalizing blackmail raised the costs and
benefits of norm criticism by exactly the same average amounts,
legalization would have no net effect on the quantity of norm
criticism, but would still increase the quantity of the least persuasive
criticism and decrease the quantity of the most persuasive criticism.
Of course, if legalizing blackmail were to raise the costs of violating
norms sufficiently, it might raise the benefits of reforming ineffi-
cient norms enough to produce a rise in all norm criticism. But
" If an individual stands to gain nothing from norm repeal, he might be the most
persuasive critic, but he also might have no reason to bother criticizing the norm. So
the most persuasive critics are likely to be those who gain the least return from norm
repeal, but who still gain some positive return.
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given the empirical uncertainties, the structural factors create a
greater risk that legalization will suppress persuasive criticism. 2
Finally, legalizing blackmail would also inhibit some of the less
persuasive criticism in the one circumstance where such criticism
might matter. Imagine that a group deters virtually all criticism of
an inefficient norm by severely sanctioning those who speak against
the norm. In this situation, the only source of criticism may be
norm violators who speak out after their violations are discovered
and publicized. When a member's violation is exposed, he may
suffer no additional sanction by initially criticizing the norm or
some part of it.73 Of course, these critics will be highly unpersua-
sive for the reasons discussed above: others will doubt the sincerity
of criticism from those who, facing sanctions, stand to gain the most
from undermining the norm. But even if there is only a very low
probability that such criticism will spur the group to rethink the
norm, in the situation described these members represent the only
source of criticism, the only chance for initiating a dialogue critical
of the norm. Blackmail, however, would silence this subgroup.
When a group member secures the secrecy of his norm violation by
7 A caveat is necessary. If an individual has sufficiently internalized a norm
against blackmail, he will notblackmail others and will expect to receive no blackmail
profits. If legalizing blackmail then increases the benefits of reforming inefficient
norms, legalization will make such individuals more likely to criticize the norm. And
because such group members include those who personally gain little from repeal,
some of their criticism will be persuasive. Thus, notwithstanding the textual
argument, the net effect of legalization on criticism is indeterminate if two conditions
hold: legalizing blackmail increases the net cost of violating norms and a substantial
pool of group members will, after legalization, be unaffected by the prospect of
blackmail profits. Obviously, both conditions are empirically possible.
I stated my reasons for doubting the first proposition in Part l.A. As for the
second, I think that most people would be able to rationalize to themselves their
lawful opportunistic blackmail just as a great many people today rationalize their
unlawful shoplifting, tax evasion, insurance fraud, employee pilfering, "hotel linen
lifting," and other "acceptable" forms of theft. See GABOR, supra note 45, at 73-97
(discussing how amateur thieves seek tojustify their crimes). Also, the existing norm
against blackmail is partly supported by its criminal prohibition, and is likely to be
weakened when this symbol of condemnation is repealed.
73 This would be true if the sanction were already the highest the group inflicted
(for example, ostracism) or if the sanction is simply not calibrated to distinguish
between repentant and unrepentant violators. Even if lack of repentance is punished
more severely, the violator may be able tofirst criticize the norm and then repent.
Unless the norm is calibrated to distinguish between immediate repenters and those
who repent after initial defiance, the criticism still costs the victim nothing, and may
generate a critical dialogue. Even if the norm is so calibrated, the violator might be
able to avoid the extra punishment if he constrains his criticism to the norm's
application to situations like his, while continuing to endorse the norm generally.
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paying a blackmail price, he will now suffer an additional public
sanction by criticizing the norm."" By driving the punishment
"underground," blackmail gives the violator a reason to keep his
criticism underground as well. Thus, at the point where an
inefficient norm is most difficult to reform, blackmail may guaran-
tee its stability.
75
In sum, blackmail works against "voice," an important mecha-
nism for refining and reforming inefficient norms.
D. Norms Theory and Blackmail: Using Law to Create Background
Conditions Favorable or Unfavorable to Norms
When discussing norm governance, most rational choice
scholarship proceeds in the following manner. One identifies a
specific norm and then determines whether a legal rule could
efficiently strengthen or weaken that norm. Eric Posner has
discussed a less direct type of legal regulation of norms.7 6 By
directly regulating solidary groups (through "group-based rules"),
the state can expand or contract the power of such groups to use
informal mechanisms of social control. This insight also applies to
indirect forms of regulation. As Posner notes, even legal rules with
universal application ("category-based rules") can, by allocating
entitlements to individuals, affect the returns of cooperating with or
defecting from solidary groups.
7"
The blackmail example demonstrates another indirect means by
which law can regulate norms. The blackmail ban does not directly
shape a particular norm, nor does it operate on norms by first
making membership in norm-enforcing groups more or less
7" Because blackmail purchases secrecy, it places Vin the position of those whose
violations remain completely undiscovered: norm criticism arouses suspicion that
they are violating the norm and raises the risk of (additional) discovery. As long as
the norm violator's reputation remains unsullied (he is not already bearing sc), his
marginal cost for criticizing the norm is positive.
' Even if there were altruists willing to criticize the norm, see supra note 66, the
public enforcement of the norm may provide the occasion and the forum at which
an altruist would most effectively communicate his criticism. If blackmail decreases
or eliminates public enforcement, it may also decrease or eliminate the opportunity
for effective altruistic criticism.
76 See Posner, supra note 8, at 136 ("[Wjhen groups are sufficiently cohesive, or
solidary, and pursue goals that are consistent with the state's, transferring resources
to them is a more efficient method for obtaining those goals than conventional
regulation of individual action.").
7 See id. at 148-50 (analyzing the effects of different types of category-based rules
on the cooperation-defection differential).
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attractive to individuals. Instead, by making norm enforcement
public, the blackmail ban directly regulates the means by which
groups enforce, internalize, and reform norms. Yet the ban works
only indirectly in that it is not focused to facilitate or impede any
particular norm, nor the norms of any particular group.- The
blackmail ban is a background legal rule determining the power and
content of group norms across the board.
The positive analysis of this Part yields certain normative
implications. One is that if norms tend to be efficient, as certain
commentators claim,7" then the blackmail ban is efficient because
it facilitates the internalization and refinement of norms. And if it
is socially desirable that norms maximize the welfare of the group,
then the blackmail ban is efficient because it facilitates the commu-
nication processes by which a group reforms dysfunctional norms.
But if, as other commentators seem to claim, 79 norms are generally
inefficient, then this Part reveals a novel benefit of legalizing
blackmail.8" The average efficiency of norms is likely to remain
controversial for some time, requiring considerably more theoretical
and empirical work to resolve. For this reason, the normative
evaluation of the blackmail ban advanced in the next Part does not
depend on the general efficiency of norms, but on the efficiency of
a particular informational norm.
Even without resolving the average efficiency of norms, however,
the blackmail example reveals greater complexity to the state's task
in norm governance. The state must select background legal rules
in combination with rules directly regulating norms. Thus, in
addition to policies that directly support and impede the enforce-
ment of efficient and inefficient norms, respectively, we may want
"'See ELLICKSoN,supra note 1, at 167 (hypothesizing that "members ofta close-knit
group develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate
welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another"). For similar
theses, see COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 249-58; Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra
note 6. Regarding their exceptions to this claim, see supra note 54.
" For pessimistic views, see RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL: THE LOGIC OF
GROUP CONFLICT 72-106 (1995); Posner, supra note 54.
" The analysis depends on the reasons for the inefficiency of norms. If norms are
inefficient from the perspective of the group (and therefore socially inefficient as
well), then the analysis of Part .C argues for the blackmail ban. Because blackmail
impedes one of the group's mechanisms for reforming inefficient norms (voice), the
greater the tendency of norms to be inefficient (from the group's perspective), the
more important it is to preserve that reform mechanism. On the other hand, if
norms are inefficient because they typically benefit the group in which they arise at
the greater expense of society, then the analysis of part .C argues against the
blackmail ban because voice will make groups more effective at rent seeking.
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the state to create background conditions either generally favorable
or hostile to norms. Indeed, even if it were impossible or impru-
dent for the state to regulate specific norms, it may not be possible
for the state to remain neutral regarding norms as a general matter.
Certain legal rules, like the blackmail ban, will have widespread if
unintended consequences for norms.
In choosing either to favor or disfavor norms generally, several
factors determine the optimal background condition. For example,
if most norms are efficient, the state should create background
conditions favorable for norms and then enact legal rules interfer-
ing with the minority of norms that are inefficient. The converse is
true if most norms are inefficient. A second factor is the relative
effectiveness of the specific norm-shaping rules. For example, if it
were generally easier to use centralized power to impede than to
facilitate specific norms, that fact would favor creating background
conditions favorable to norms and then using the more cost-
effective specific-interference rules for curbing inefficient norms.
Again, the converse is true if centralized support of norms is more
effective than centralized interference. Whatever the efficient
combination of rules, it is important first to identify the legal rules
that affect the basic background conditions for norm formation and
enforcement. The blackmail ban is one such rule.
II. THE EFFICIENCY OF THE BLACKMAIL BAN WITH
PRIVACY NORMS
In recent years, a great many scholars have attempted to explain
precisely what is wrong with blackmail.8  The prohibition on
blackmail presents something of a puzzle: The blackmailer is
punished for giving his victim a choice between paying a price and
suffering an embarrassing yet lawful disclosure of information. The
" Jim Lindgren first referred to the problem as the "paradox" of blackmail. See
Lindgren, supra note 10, at 671. Lindgren was not the first to notice the difficulty of
distinguishing blackmail threats from lawful threats. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg
& Paul Shechtman, Blackmail: An Economic Analysis of the Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1849 (1993) (first circulated in unpublished form in 1979); Eric Mack, In Defense of
Blackmail, 41 PHIL. STUD. 273, 273-74 (1982); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Blackmail: A
Preliminary Inquiry, 63 MONIST 156, 156-57 (1980). But Lindgren's formulation of the
problem spurred many other theorists to attempt an explanation of the blackmail
ban. See, e.g., 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:
HARMLESS WRONGDOING 238-76 (1988); Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture:
Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655, 656 (1988); Symposium, Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1565 (1993).
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law prohibits the threat to disclose information even when the
disclosure itself is neither criminal nor tortious. If an individual is
legally entitled to tell the world some secret fact about a person,
why is he forbidden from selling to that person his right to make
the disclosure? The choice would seem to make the "victim" better
off in any instance in which he chooses to pay the blackmail price.
This Part addresses this much debated normative issue.
Consideration of group norms reveals new efficiencies in the
prohibition on blackmail. These efficiencies do not by themselves
justify prohibiting blackmail. Instead, I begin with an extant
economic theory of the ban. But, assuming the reigning theory is
otherwise valid, it is underinclusive, justifying only part of the
prohibition. My claim is that the existence of certain norms
explains why the ban extends as broadly as it does, that an analysis
of norms fills a significant gap in existing theory.
2
Part II.A explains this theoretical gap: the problem of"opportu-
nistic" blackmail, where the blackmailer threatens to disclose
information he obtained adventitiously, not as a result of invest-
ment."3 The remainder of the Part then explains why the ban on
opportunistic blackmail is efficient. Part II.B argues that the
regulation of adventitiously acquired information is necessarily
"second-best," the choice being between a regime banning blackmail
and producing excessive disclosure (because of a desire to gossip)
and a regime permitting blackmail and producing excessive secrecy
(because of a market failure due to asymmetric transaction costs).
Part I.C then claims that informational norms obligating privacy
correct the first problem to a greater degree than informational
norms obligating disclosure would correct the second. The
conditions in which privacy and disclosure norms arise ensure that
the former will be more powerful than the latter. Thus, the relevant
social control choice is not between law and norms, but between
one bundle of legal and norm-based rules and another. The legal
rule banning blackmail is preferable because the norms that arise
along with the ban make this bundle more efficient than a legal rule
82 Thus, my goal here is solely to demonstrate how a norms analysis usefully
supplements an existing economic theory of blackmail. If I am right, my analysis
answers the most telling criticism of the economic approach to blackmail. Beyond
this, however, I do not attempt to evaluate the relative merits of the economic and
noneconomic theories of blackmail.
" See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 690 (citing HEPWORTH, supra note 10, at 75-76).
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permitting blackmail along with the norms that would exist in
tandem with that rule.
A. The Continuing Puzzle of Opportunistic Blackmail
Economic theorists have made considerable progress in
explaining the prohibition on blackmail. To summarize briefly a
substantial literature-at the risk of omitting important details-the
central evil of blackmail is that it induces investment in a wasteful
or "sterile" activity."s If blackmail were legal, individuals would
expend resources acquiring negative information about others in
order to extract a payment from them. Viewed ex ante, legalizing
blackmail makes victims worse off because it creates an incentive for
blackmailers to discover secrets they would otherwise never bother
to learn. The victim's payment to the blackmailer is a wealth
transfer benefitting the blackmailer exactly as much as it harms the
victim. But the blackmailer's initial investment in gaining the
blackmail information ensures that his net gain is less than the
victim's loss. In short, the industry consumes resources merely to
transfer wealth rather than to create it.
8 5
The blackmail transaction would not be sterile, however, if it
provided useful incentives to potential victims. Much of the
literature attempts to evaluate the incentives blackmail creates. The
most discussed example is crime: if the state permitted the
blackmail of criminals, perhaps it would raise the cost of committing
crime. 6 But, as Part L.A explained, blackmail can either increase
or decrease the cost of a secret activity. Although legalizing
blackmail would increase investment in discovering crimes, it would
also cause people to conceal criminal discoveries they would have
made without investment. As Steven Shavell notes, some members
of this latter group, who would have volunteered information to law
enforcement when blackmail was illegal, will now offer the criminal
the option of replacing a more severe sanction (such as prison)
with a less severe sanction, the blackmail price.' Although there
84 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 81, at 671; Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 81, at
1859-65; Posner, supra note 24, at 1820.
Blackmail is like theft in this regard. See Posner, supra note 24, at 1820.
"See, e.g., Brown, supra note 27, at 1943-49 (arguing that legalizing blackmail of
criminals would increase deterrence of crime); Posner, supra note 24, at 1821-27
(finding ambiguous effects); Shavell, supra note 28, at 1892 (arguing that banning
blackmail of criminals has ambiguous effects on deterrence, because "the likelihood
of punishment should fall even though the magnitude should rise").
'7 See Shavell, supra note 28, at 1891-92.
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are many further wrinkles in the analysis," the net effect is
essentially ambiguous and the literature is, to my mind, inconclu-
sive. Incentives do not provide a compelling argument for
legalizing some subset of blackmail, but neither do they create an
independent argument for prohibition. The economic case against
blackmail is not that we know the incentive effects are bad but that
we doubt the effects are good and we do not want substantial
resources invested in what is probably a sterile activity."9
The wasteful investment theory, however, suffers from a
substantial weakness. The theory really explains only why we
prohibit people from investing in the blackmail enterprise. Jim
Lindgren, who first made this objection to the economic analysis of
blackmail, states the matter this way: Economic theory explains why
we prohibit "commercial" blackmail, that is, where the blackmailer
invested in gaining the secret information. But the theory does not
explain why we prohibit "opportunistic" blackmail, that is, where the
blackmailer adventitiously discovered the secret information.9" If
" For example, Shavell compares the effect of permitting blackmail to a system
of rewards for those who provide evidence to the state and also considers the special
problem of exempting law enforcement officers from a regime allowing blackmail of
criminals. See Shavell, supra note 28, at 1899-1901. Brown discusses the effect of
permitting blackmail with and without rules imposing a duty to report criminal
activities, and also in comparison to Shavell's system of bounties. See Brown, supra
note 27, at 1943-49. Among other things, Posner distinguishes between blackmail of
criminal acts already punished by the state and criminal acts not yet punished. See
Posner, supra note 24, at 1821-27.
" See Posner, supra note 24, at 1827 ("As a costly and apparently sterile
redistributive activity, blackmail fits the economic definition of a common law crime.
The speculative argument that blackmail might serve a socially productive role...
does not justify removing it from the prohibited category, when the opposite
argument.., is equally plausible." (footnote omitted)).
" See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 690-91;James Lindgren, Blackmail: An Afterword,
141 U. PA. L. REv. 1975, 1984-86 (1993) [hereinafter Lindgren, Blackmail: An
Afterword];James Lindgren, Blackmail: On Waste, Morals and Ronald Coase, 36 UCLA
L. REv. 597, 600-03 (1989). Lindgren uses the argument to criticize economic
theories of the blackmail ban and strengthen the case for his noneconomic theory.
In making his point, Lindgren borrows Hepworth's four-part taxonomy. See
HEPWORTH, supra note 10, at 73-77. The two other categories of blackmail are:
"entrepreneurial" and "participant." Both mean the blackmailer acquired the
blackmail information by participating with the victim in the behavior that the victim
wishes to conceal. "Entrepreneurial" blackmail means the participation was done with
the purpose of setting up a blackmail opportunity; "participant" means the
opportunity for blackmail did not induce the blackmailer's participation. For
simplicity, I use the term opportunistic to include participant blackmail and
commercial to include entrepreneurial blackmail.
1996] 2269
2270 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 2237
B does not invest in but merely stumbles upon negative information
about V, why is B's blackmail of V criminal?
Lindgren's challenge recalls Anthony Kronman's distinction
concerning information disclosure during contract negotiation0
9
Kronman says that contract law should not, and typically does not,
require disclosure of information a party acquired through
investment, but should and typically does require disclosure of
information adventitiously acquired. For Kronman, the point of the
distinction is to protect socially useful investments in information.
Lindgren makes the same distinction when seeking to suppress
socially unproductive investments in information: Prohibiting the
use of information one has acquired by investment does not require
prohibiting the use of information one has acquired by accident. 2
To date, there has been no adequate answer to Lindgren's
criticism." Some theorists have responded by asserting that
adventitious discoverers of information have no reason to bear the
" See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law
of Contracts, 7J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978) (explaining why contract law only sometimes
imposes a duty to disclose on a party with greater information).
" In a similar vein, consider Richard Posner's explanation for the fact that
blackmail is defined to require a threat. A person does not commit blackmail unless
he threatens to disclose another's secret; receiving money for keeping silent is not
blackmail if one did not first threaten to disclose. Posner defends this distinction by
claiming that, if one cannot threaten to disclose information damaging to others, one
is not likely to invest in acquiring such information. See Posner, supra note 24, at
1836. Thus, the rule is narrowly tailored, according to Posner, only to prevent sterile
investment. Lindgren's point is that the economic explanation of blackmail implies
that we should tailor the rule slightly further to permit threats to disclose information
if there was no investment to acquire the information.
"s A possible response is the difficulty of distinguishing between commercial and
opportunistic blackmail. Given the opportunity for concealing one's investment, the
administrative and/or error costs of making such a distinction may be high. But I
find this explanation unsatisfying. First, if Kronman is right, the common law makes
just such a distinction-between commercial and opportunistic information
discoveries-in contract law. See Kronman, supra note 91, at 18. Yet criminal law is
usually more willing to bear administrative costs to accord individualizedjustice than
civil law. And from an economic perspective, it is generally more important to
narrowly tailor punitive sanctions than remedial ones. Second, if Richard Posner is
right, blackmail law requires a threat because, ex ante, sterile investment will occur
only if blackmailers can make threats. See Posner, supra note 24, at 1836. But the
administrative costs of distinguishing"implied" threats from nonthreats are probably
as great as those of distinguishing commercial from opportunistic blackmail. More
generally, though administrative difficulties are undoubtedly powerful explanations
in some contexts, there is a danger of overusing the explanation whenever the
substantive analysis breaks down. Among other things, this Article offers a way of
explaining the ban on adventitious blackmail that is not highly dependent on
administrative costs.
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costs of publicizing their discovery (except perhaps to establish a
reputation useful for future commercial blackmail). Permitting
blackmail will encourage B to threaten a disclosure he would not
make if blackmail were illegal. 4 The result is to make V worse off
and to waste the transaction costs necessary to reach a blackmail
agreement. But Lindgren's retort is simple: Why assume that
disclosing information is a "cost"? People disclose information all
the time-they talk, they write, they publish-and they seem to enjoy
it.95 Even the disclosure of negative information about others-
sometimes called "gossip"-is, for many, a favorite pastime, a
consumption good rather than a burden. Lindgren is surely right
on this point.96 If so, many adventitious discoverers of negative
information will gossip about it, unless paid for their silence. If V
is willing to pay B to forgo the pleasures of gossip in this circum-
stance, why should we prohibit what appears to be a pareto-superior
trade?' The existence of group norms provides a possible answer.
B. Choosing the Second-Best: Unavoidable Inefficiencies
in the Distribution of Information
By definition, permitting opportunistic blackmail does not cause
any investment of resources, wasteful or otherwise, into acquiring
information for blackmail purposes. The question, then, is whether
permitting such blackmail will produce a more efficient distribution
of adventitiously discovered information, that is, whether those who
value such information the most will receive it. The problem is
complex because for some information widespread circulation is
',See, e.g., Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 81, at 1875-76 (arguing that an
adventitious discoverer has no reason to incur the expense of publication unless "he
is looking to future opportunities for blackmail"). If the costs of disclosure cause
adventitious discoverers to keep silent, then the subjects of the information do not
require a blackmail contract to secure their secret.
9 See Lindgren, Blackmail: An Afterword, supra note 90, at 1984-86 (noting that
people frequently gossip without receiving any tangible benefits in return).
'6 See supra note 20.
97Shavell responds to Lindgren's challenge by asserting the incentive effects on
the victim: "[T]o avoid being blackmailed by workmen or others who might by
chance be present, potential victims will exercise excessive precautions or reduce their
level of innocent, yet embarrassing, activities." Shavell, supra note 28, at 1903. But
Lindgren correctly claims that this kind of analysis assumes that, absent the
opportunity for blackmail, the embarrassing information will not be disclosed. See
Lindgren, Blackmail: An Afterword, supra note 90, at 1984. If people enjoy gossip,
however, potential victims will invest in avoiding such embarrassments even if
opportunistic blackmail is banned.
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efficient; for other information, circulation is inefficient. It furthers
group interests for everyone to acquire information, for example,
about crimes, torts, norm violations, or the occupational compe-
tence of market players (for example, that a dentist in the neighbor-
hood is particularly good at dealing with children). But the group
suffers if gossip circulates private information the disclosure of
which harms the individual subject more than it benefits partici-
pants in the gossip."8 Thus, the efficient outcome is somewhere
between complete disclosure and complete secrecy. Unfortunately,
neither the regime banning blackmail nor a regime permitting
blackmail is likely to achieve the optimal distribution of informa-
tion.
1. The Love of Gossip: Why a Blackmail Ban
Produces Excessive Disclosure
Assuming perfect enforcement, the blackmail ban prevents the
subject of information-the blackmail victim-from paying to
preserve its secrecy. Because the blackmail ban does not prevent
third parties from paying for the disclosure of information, the ban
seems to ensure that more information will be disclosed and
disseminated than is efficient. Indeed, because many people who
There is a substantial body of economic criticism of privacy claims, based on the
insight that privacy facilitates fraud. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OFJUSTICE 232 (1981) ("[Slocia, like business, dealings present opportunities for
exploitation through misrepresentation."); see also Symposium, The Law and Economics
of Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 621 (1981). But there dearly remains a category of
private facts the disclosure of which is inefficient. For example, Richard Posner
distinguishes between "discrediting" and "embarrassing" publicity, the latter
consisting of facts an individual wishes to conceal, not to gain an edge in transactions,
but only to preserve his "constructed public self." See RICHARD A. POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW 539 (1995). Posner's examples include "a newspaper photograph
of a person bathing" or a report that one's "daughter was raped and murdered." Id.
Even when they are not relevant to any instrumental end, he notes the stronghuman
appetite for concealing such facts about oneself and learning such facts about others.
See id. at 539-40.
On the other hand, Posner seems to defend an unfettered right to publicize
discrediting facts, by which he means true facts that affect one's transactional
opportunities. See id. at 539-44. But he does not acknowledge that private facts may
be both discrediting and embarrassing, and that the harmful embarrassment that
publicity causes the subject can, in principle, exceed the value third parties obtain
from the subject's being discredited. The efficient distribution of information need
not, therefore, include disclosure of every bit of discrediting data. For a fuller
treatment of this issue, see Richard Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information:
An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 CEO. L.J. (forthcomingJuly 1996).
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enjoy gossip will pass information for free,9 banning blackmail
appears to ensure nearly universal disclosure. On the other hand,
absent some market failure, one should expect that a free market in
blackmail, where all parties are permitted to bid for secrecy or
disclosure, would achieve the optimal distribution of information.
Thus, if one imagines information disclosure as a continuum
ranging from "excessive secrecy" to "excessive disclosure" with
"optimal disclosure" somewhere in between, one might presume
that the market can achieve optimal disclosure and that the
blackmail ban ensures excessive disclosure.
Absent consideration of norms, I assume that this analysis is
correct in concluding that the ban on blackmail will produce
excessive disclosure. But, for the reasons addressed next, the free-
market rule permitting blackmail will also fail to achieve optimal
disclosure.
2. Asymmetric Transaction Costs: Why a Lawful Blackmail
Market Would Produce Excessive Secrecy
Market transactions-including blackmail-appear to be an
efficient means of allocating information. People have nonpropri-
etary secrets and some willingness to pay to keep those secrets.
After B discovers V's secret, B can negotiate with V for a blackmail
(secrecy) contract,00 or with TP for a disclosure contract. At this
point, the transaction costs might be fairly low in comparison to the
gains V or TP might make from a blackmail or disclosure contract
with B. The situation is analogous to B having a single good for
sale, which TP wants, but which V does not want TP to have. An
auction in which V and TP bid against each other for the good
would seem a suitable way to resolve the matter efficiently. If the
market worked in this manner, there would be no instance where B
inefficiently conceals V's secret from TP; barring nonmarket
behavior (for example, violent threats), the only inefficient secrets
would be those known only to the subject of the secret (V).
" See supra notes 20-21.
100 If it were necessary for everyone to reach advance agreements with everyone
else about what to do upon the discovery of another's secret, the transaction costs
would be prohibitive. But blackmail is a two-step process which permits a bargaining
opportunity: First, B discovers the information (in the case of opportunistic
blackmail, by accident), and second, B releases it. It is not necessary for V or TP to
bargain with everyone in the world who might accidentally discover information that
they, respectively, wish to conceal or discover. B can negotiate with V or TP after
making the discovery, but before making the disclosure decision.
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But a free market in blackmail would actually produce excessive
secrecy. When the good is nonproprietary information, the market
fails to handle the conflict efficiently." 1 In this three-way negotia-
tion, there are two sets of transaction costs-those for the B-V
agreement (for secrecy) and those for the B-TP agreement (for
disclosure). Obviously, the outcome depends in part on the size of
each transaction cost relative to the corresponding contractual
surplus-there being no gains from trade if the former exceeds the
latter. But it also matters what the transaction costs are relative to
one another. Assume that V bids $x for secrecy, that TP bids $y for
disclosure, that the transaction costs for the B-V transaction are tcBV,
and that the transaction costs for the B-TP transaction are tCB.Tp.
Assuming at least one value is positive, B will choose the higher of
the values (x - tcBv) and (y - tciTp). An asymmetry in transaction
costs will cause B to choose inefficiently when x > y > (y - tc.Tp) >
(x - tCB-v), in which case he will disclose even though V is willing
to pay more than TP. Similarly, when y > x > (x - tcB-v) > (y - tcB-Tp),
B will remain silent even though TP is willing to pay more than V.
The potential for asymmetry matters because TP faces systemati-
cally higher transaction costs than V, and the resulting asymmetry
leads B to preserve secrecy excessively. There are at least two
factors working to ensure that tCB-Tp > tcBv. First, transaction costs
increase with the number of people involved in the bargaining. In
the blackmail scenario, there are likely to be more TPs than Vs. The
reason is that B's information is secret. With rare exceptions, all
the Vs already know the information that they would prefer to keep
secret. Yet the more people who currently have the information,
the less likely it is that knowledge of the information is limited and
controlled, and therefore the less likely that the information
remains "secret." Thus, the fact that information pertaining to large
numbers of Vs is less likely to be a secret naturally limits opportu-
nity for blackmail in such cases. 2 But there is no such limitation
101 SeeJoseph Isenbergh, Blackmailfrom A to C, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1905, 1923-25
(1993) (arguing that blackmail, a transaction involving pure information, is
particularly susceptible to high informational transaction costs).
"' It takes only one person to "leak" the secret to the world. Even though each
V may suffer from disclosure, there are many reasons a particular V might disclose:
He may place an unusually high intrinsic value on disclosure, he may be subject to
particularly powerful second-party incentives, or he may stand to gain the third-party
rewards for being the first to pierce a "conspiracy ofsilence." The more Vs there are
with a common secret, the greater the chances that one will find it desirable to
disclose.
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on the number of TPs-the people who would value the information,
but who are unaware of its existence. Thus, it is likely that B will
need to bargain with more TPs than Vs. Therefore, on average B
will incur higher transaction costs extracting the value of disclosure
from TP than extracting the value of secrecy from V.' 3
Second, the transaction costs for the B-TP agreement (dis-
closure) exceed the transaction costs for the B-V agreement
(secrecy) because of what might be termed an informational
bargaining dilemma. As Thomas Schelling aptly noted: "It is hard to
sell a secret without giving it away."' ° It is difficult to extract
the value of information from a buyer without describing the
information to be sold, yet describing the information may
effectively give away what one is trying to sell."0 5 The problem
ios See WendyJ. Gordon, Truth and Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's Central
Case, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1754 (1993) (arguing by example that a person with
information about an embezzling mayor could not practically contact the multitude
of voters who might be willing to pay for such information); Posner, supra note 24,
at 1822-23 ("Often the benefits of the information will be highly diffuse, being spread
across a variety of actual and potential transactors with the blackmail victim, some of
whom may not even be identifiable."). In addition, when B stumbles upon a valuable
piece of secret information, he is more likely to know who the relevant V is than who
the relevant TPs are. He may, of course, know both, but the kind of information that
is useful for blackmail identifies V more commonly than it identifies TP. Discovering
adultery, for example, usually involves gaining more information about the adulterer
than about the adulterer's spouse. Similarly, stumbling upon confidential notes of
a psychiatrist is more likely to identify the patient-V-than the persons who would
like to know that V is seeing a psychiatrist. Counterexamples clearly exist-
discovering evidence of embezzlement might reveal the victim (TP), but not the
perpetrator (11). Nonetheless, I believe that adventitiously discovered blackmail
information identifies V more often than TP, thus providing another reason why B's
costs of dealing with TP are higher than his costs of dealing with V.
104 THOMAS SCHELUINc, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 29 (1978).
105 See Isenbergh, supra note 101, at 1923 ("B cannot bargain with [the victim] over
the value of the information without revealing some part of it, thereby reducing the
amount still undisclosed."); Posner, supra note 24, at 1823 (same). This point is also
necessary to complete Kronman's explanation for contract disclosure doctrine.
Kronman argues that the law permits contracting parties to withhold information they
gain by investment in order to preserve the incentive to make investments. See
Kronman, supra note 91, at 9-18 (describing how a duty of disclosure decreases the
incentive to invest in information discovery by depriving the knowledgeable party of
the private advantage which the information would otherwise afford). If transaction
costs were zero, however, parties would contract around whatever disclosure doctrine
the law imposed. The party with secret information, for example, would offer to sell
the information (for example, that the price of cotton is about to rise or that some
land contains valuable minerals) rather than buy the tangible asset (for example,
cotton or land) involved. In the end, however, the disclosure rule does matter
because of the informational bargaining dilemma. A contracting party in these
situations would risk giving his information away in the course of selling it. Thus, we
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arises when the information is not proprietary and one can
easily exclude others from using the information only by keeping it
secret.
Consider an example: B learns that V is having an adulterous
affair. B now attempts to sell that information to TP, V's wife,
whom B correctly assumes would place a high value on such
information. If B tells TP all that he knows and then asks for
payment, TP has no reason to pay for what she already has. If B
merely tells TP she should pay him a specific sum after which he
will give her something equally valuable, she has no reason to trust
him sufficiently to make the payment. Suppose B adopts an
intermediate strategy of describing some but not all of the informa-
tion, stating to TP, for example, that he has information "about
your husband" or information "about your marriage." Now he risks
both sides of the dilemma: (1) that he has disclosed too much and
TP can, with minimal investigation, discern the remaining informa-
tion, or (2) that he has disclosed too little and TP will not believe he
really has anything of value.
There are ways of solving this problem, but few are available to
the opportunistic blackmailer, and those that are available signifi-
cantly raise the transaction costs of B's dealing with TP."° Repu-
tation is one solution, but in the context of opportunistic black-
mail B is not likely to have a reputation as a person who always
names a fair price for his information.1 0 7 There are also contrac-
allow the party with information acquired by investment to purchase the tangible
assets useful for exploiting that information without first revealing the information
to the seller of the assets.
106 Posner makes the same point. See Posner, supra note 24, at 1823. The
problem does not arise when the information is proprietary because courts will
enforce B's exclusive right to the information. Thus, the analysis does not apply if
(1) TP places great value on being able to prove the secret, apart from knowing of its
existence, and (2) B has personal property (for example, photographs or financial
documents) that provides such proof. In that case, B can do what most buyers do:
display his tangible property to TP, but refuse to part with it unless TP meets his
price.
107 Reputation can still solve the problem where TP is a repeat buyer of such
information or where TP has an agent who acts as a repeat buyer. Tabloid news-
papers serve this function for information about celebrities. For example, after
receiving a description of the information to be sold, the National Enquirer may offer
to pay for the complete story if it subsequently publishes any part of it. People with
information might fear that the Enquirer would avoid payment by various forms of
strategic behavior. Nevertheless, Bs proceed despite these potential problems because
the Enquirer benefits in the long run by maintaining a reputation for dealing fairly
with its sources. Consequently, the informational bargaining dilemma may not exist
when V is a celebrity.
GROUP NORMS, GOSSIP, AND BLACKMAIL
tual solutions that work well in other contexts: The parties could
agree (1) that TP promises to make no "use" of B's information
after he discloses it unless TP first purchases B's assent; or (2)
that if B's information "benefits" TP, B will share a percentage of
that benefit. But while a contractual solution is effective in
situations where TP's use of the information is easy to define and
verify, much blackmail information concerns embarrassing facts
that are useful merely by knowing of their existence. In other
cases, the use of damaging facts may be difficult or impossible to
verify. Moreover, much of the benefit TP derives from the informa-
tion may have no, or no easily measured, economic benefit for B to
share.
Note that where B knows a secret of V-the blackmail situation-
the law does not prohibit B from selling that secret to TP. Yet
despite the legality of such transactions, they seem to be rare.
Lindgren, for example, argues that banning opportunistic blackmail
causes B to disclose excessively, not because TP will pay B to
disclose-but because B will gain the intrinsic pleasure of gossip.
The absence of such transactions between B and TP is explained by
the informational bargaining dilemma B faces in such situations.
On the other hand, the fact that B does occasionally manage to
blackmail V, despite the potential criminal sanctions,'08 demon-
strates that bargaining with V does not raise the informational
bargaining dilemma. Valready knows the information, or if he does
not know it, he is still subject to blackmail once he does. Bargain-
ing with V does not diminish or risk diminishing the value of B's
asset.
In short, asymmetric transaction costs provide V a compara-
tive advantage over TP in bribing B; therefore, an unfettered
blackmail market would produce inefficiently low levels of disclo-
sure. 109
108 See Posner, supra note 24, at 1842 (finding 124 reported cases involving
blackmail prosecutions).
109 This point applies only to nonproprietary information. Where the law creates
an enforceable right to exclude others from using information or ideas, one does not
risk losing value by describing the information in the course of trying to sell it. Why
the law refuses to grant some information the status of property is beyond the scope
of this Article. But if the argument in Part II.C is correct, it may be that where the
stakes are low, norm-based regulation of information is more cost-effective than the
expensive process of enforcing legal rules.
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C. Informational Norms: Why Privacy Norms Correct the Inefficiency
of the Blackmail Ban More Effectively Than Disclosure Norms
Would Correct the Inefficiency of a Lawful Blackmail Market
The ban on opportunistic blackmail produces inefficiently high
disclosure because, absent market payments, B will gossip even
when his benefit is less than the loss imposed on V. But a free
market in opportunistic blackmail produces inefficiently low
disclosure because asymmetric transaction costs (ATC) ensure that
V outbids TP even when TP values disclosure more than V values
secrecy. Thus, we are faced with a policy choice between two flawed
options. Determining which inefficiency is greater is quite difficult,
apparently leaving no powerful reason for choosing one over the
other. 10
When we introduce the possibility of informational norms,
however, we discover a basis for selecting one rule over the other.
An asymmetry exists that permits informational norms to correct
the inefficiency of the blackmail ban more effectively than they
correct the inefficiency of the lawful blackmail regime. Indeed, one
reason why it is difficult to determine which suboptimal choice is
better, without discussing norms, is the difficulty of predicting what
B will do with information in the absence of monetary incentives.
Because asymmetric transaction costs block B-TP agreements for
disclosure and the blackmail ban blocks B-V agreements for secrecy,
B's decision must be made without monetary inducements. I argue
that this result is the whole point of the ban-that the absence of
such inducements creates optimal conditions for informal norm
enforcement. I proceed by (1) identifying the existence of privacy
norms, (2) explaining why they partly correct the inefficiency of the
blackmail ban, and (3) demonstrating that disclosure norms would
not provide an equivalent correction for the inefficiency of a lawful
blackmail market.
11' If the ATC market failure blocks all B-TP transactions, then the question is-for
the kind of information that is accidentally discovered-does the universe of Vs value
secrecy more or less than the universe of TPs values disclosure? Some people seem
to think the answer is obviously "more," meaning that the universal disclosure
resulting from a blackmail ban is worse than universal nondisclosure. But I think that
intuition is skewed by the fact that, because blackmail is currently banned, we live in
a world in which there are a great many inefficient disclosures and these inefficient
disclosures are more likely to come to our attention than inefficient secrets. If one
stops taking for granted the efficient disclosures that the ban secures, the overall
effect is indeterminate (except for the following textual argument).
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1. The Existence of Privacy Norms
Social groups face a collective action problem concerning
"appropriately private" information-information the disclosure
of which harms V more than it benefits TP. Each person may
gain some small enjoyment from passing along such titillating
information, but the group as a whole is worse off when everyone
behaves that way. For example, disclosure of certain medical
conditions, physical abnormalities, sexual practices, or victimiza-
tions may prove mildly interesting to others, but cause great
embarrassment to the subject whose privacy is thereby disturbed.
Indeed, the problem is severe because individuals have another
incentive to pass information that is detrimental to group welfare.
Gossip can benefit the gossiper in the same relative way that other
means of "putting down" others can benefit an individual. In
contrast to the target of the gossip, the gossiper and gossip
recipient are positively distinguished.'1 2  People are strongly
motivated to obtain relative position or social status. 13 One
means of gaining relative position is to lower the position of others.
If everyone in a social group follows this tactic, however, the
result is destructive to the group.11 4 Consequently, groups need
especially to restrain individuals from using gossip in this strategic
manner. 115
. See supra note 98.
2 See e.g.,J.K. CAMPBELL, HONOUR, FAMILY AND PATRONAGE 272 (1964) ("[S]ince
the downfall of one family validates and in some sense improves the status of other
families, men attempt by every means of allusive gossip and criticism of conduct to
deny each other their pretensions to honour."); Robert Paine, What Is Gossip About?
An Al-nativeHypothesis, 2 MAN 278,280 (1967) ("[Glossipers also have rival interests;
... they gossip ... to forward and protect their individual interests."). see also
ELIZABETH COLSON, THE MAKAH INDIANS 201-35 (1953) (discussing the use of gossip
in competitive struggles for status).
"s See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE LJ. 1, 28-48 (1992).
H4 See id. at 55-59.
"s Perhaps even more basic than privacy norms are norms against false gossip.
Close-knit groups appear to enforce gossip norms that condemn those who
maliciously spread falsehoods about others. See e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 215
("Victims who retaliate with gossip are of course tightly constrained by the remedial
norm that gossip must be truthful. This general principle is important enough to
have earned a spot in the Ten Commandments: 'Thou shalt not bear false witness
against thy neighbors.'"); ARTHUR J. VIDICH & JOSEPH BENSMAN, SMALL ToWN IN
MASS SOCIETY 36 (1968) (noting that the malicious spreader of false gossip is the
"most despised person in the community"). Indeed, people use the term gossip
pejoratively to refer to precisely these kinds of destructive discussions. See infra notes
121-22 and accompanying text.
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My claim is that groups routinely enforce informational norms-
"privacy norms"-that work to maximize group welfare by reducing
inefficient disclosures of appropriately private information. The
empirical claim is that there are norms requiring that one not seek
certain kinds of informationabsent compelling reasons and also that
one not disclose certain kinds of information except to certain
persons for certain reasons."1 Some of the rules limiting acquisi-
tion of information are sufficiently common to be genuinely
"social," as opposed to merely group, norms; for example, absent
unusual circumstances, one must avoid reading another person's
mail or diary, peering into the windows of another person's home,
or intruding upon the seclusion of another person's shower or
toilet. More generally, in social settings, one develops a reputation
for rudeness by failing to accommodate others who wish to hold a
private conversation or by commonly asking for information that
people prefer not to disclose.1
7
Nondisclosure norms are more complex because they are more
sensitive to reasons and relationships. As Ferdinand Schoeman
notes, if one knows a friend has been raped, one might, without
violating a privacy norm, tell other friends of the victim who would
provide her emotional support. I8 But if a person discovers that
a mere acquaintance has been raped, disclosing that fact to every
other acquaintance of the victim would incur considerable social
disapproval."' The same is true of many other facts. Privacy
norms do not forbid everyone in every circumstance from disclosing
116 do not claim that privacy norms arise in every case where they are needed,
or that they work perfectly where they do arise. In general, the sanctioning system
will not work if the private gain from the targeted behavior is too high, or if the
likelihood of detecting the behavior is too low. Regarding privacy norms, sometimes
B will gain a sufficient benefit from embarrassing V-such as intrinsic pleasure from
gossiping or a reciprocal favor from TP for sharing the information-that he will
willingly bear any likely sanction. Also, sometimes B will be able to disclose
anonymously without risk of sanction. If either condition is sufficiently common, a
privacy norm may never arise. Even where it does arise, a particular B will violate it
if his benefits are still high enough or the risks of detection are still low enough.
11 Examples of the latter include asking how much money someone makes or any
of the facts discussed in the next paragraph.
11 See Ferdinand Schoeman, Gossip and Privacy, in GOOD GOSSIP, supra note 20,
at 72, 79.
"" As a matter of policy, most newspapers refuse to identify rape victims, at least
before trial. See Paul Marcus & Tara L. McMahon, Limiting Disclosure of Rape Victims'
Identities, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1021 n.3 (1991). This fact reflects a broader norm
against such disclosures. See Naming Names, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 29, 1991, at 26
(reporting that 77% of the public approves of the policy of nondisclosure followed
by most news organizations).
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the fact that a person was adopted, suffered incest as a child, had a
spouse who committed suicide, accidentally killed someone, enjoys
a particular sexual activity, or suffers from cancer, AIDS, sterility,
or impotence. For each example, one can imagine cases where
limited disclosure incurs no sanction, such as where one discloses
the information to a psychiatrist or doctor who provides treatment
for the subject, to a close friend who will provide comfort to the
subject, or perhaps to an individual seeking a relationship with the
subject in which one of these facts would be relevant. But disclos-
ing such information merely for its amusement value, to demon-
strate that one is "in the know," or, worse, for the purpose of
inflicting harm, will commonly incur serious social sanctions. Even
disclosing for a sufficient reason will incur some disapproval if one
discloses the private information more widely than necessary.
The examples also demonstrate my normative claim that privacy
norms tend to maximize the welfare of the group in which they
arise. Where the harm of disclosure is manifest, these norms are
sensitive to the benefit of disclosure and are more likely to permit
disclosure where the benefit is great.12 On the other hand,
privacy norms most emphatically condemn disclosure generated by
the group's collective action problem, where disclosure generates
only mild amusement or relative distinction. Consider the appar-
ently conflicting norms concerning gossip. As many scholars have
noted, in a wide variety of societies and social groups, "gossip" is
both widely practiced and widely condemned."2 I do not believe
the explanation is hypocrisy. Instead, we often practice gossip
either by passing essentially harmless information for its amusement
value or by passing genuinely harmful information for adequate
reasons. But when we condemn "gossip," we use the term narrowly
to refer to cases where the gossiper passes damaging information
without adequate reason,12 2 and particularly where the gossiper is
M20 Similarly, norms against information acquisition facilitate the creation of
private spaces necessary for relaxation or self-expression, or merely to satisfy an
internalized sense of modesty. See Schoeman, supra note 118, at 74 (arguing that
social norms restrict access to an individual in certain domains in order to promote
individuality, private life, and the integrity of various spheres of life).
121 See Edith B. Gelles, Gossip: An Eighteenth.Centuoy Case, 22J. Soc. HIST. 667,
667 (1989) (-[E]vidence from many different sources implies that in every age people
have gossiped, and for as long as literature has referenced gossip, its reputation has
remained negative."); see also SPACKS, supra note 20, at 24-26 (discussing the
"reputation" of gossip).
2 SeeJOHN SABINI & MAURY SILVER, MORALITIES OF EVERYDAY LIFE 91-93 (1982)
(claiming that the pejorative term "'gossip' highlights the idleness of talk," its
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acting strategically to advance his relative interests by sabotaging
others. That this latter form of gossip is so widely condemned is
evidence of the strength and pervasiveness of privacy norms.
Definitive proof of these claims awaits a close analysis of the
informational practices of particular groups. I suspect that close-
knit groups enforce privacy norms more tailored to their circum-
stances than the above examples suggest. For instance, the
residents of Cavendish, Vermont apparently refused to divulge the
location of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's home to most inquirers for the
seventeen years that he lived there. 2 ' But the anecdotal evidence
of privacy norms is sufficient to make my descriptive and normative
claims plausible and to merit an investigation into the effect of such
norms on the efficiency of blackmail.
2. Privacy Norms Reduce the Excessive Disclosure
Caused By a Blackmail Ban
Absent norms, the blackmail ban creates the inefficiency of
excessive disclosure. But privacy norms work to correct this
inefficiency. Each privacy norm carves out an exception to the
baseline of gossip. Upon discovery of information about V, B will
now gossip in some cases and, respecting privacy norms, remain
silent in others. If the privacy exceptions tend to be welfare
maximizing-if they arise where disclosure does more harm than
good-then B will remain silent in cases where silence promotes
group welfare. Thus, we do not have to choose between complete
secrecy (where blackmail is permitted) and complete disclosure
(where blackmail is banned). By removing all the monetary
incentives from B's decision-by creating a space of market
irrelevance to any plan of action); Nicholas Emler, Gossip, Reputation, and Social
Adaptation, in GOOD GossiP, supra note 20, at 117, 120 (noting that "the term 'gossip'
is often used in common parlance not as a neutral description ... but as a moral
judgment").
12 See Ross Sneyd, When Solzhenitsyn Departs, Life Won't Be the Same for Vermont
Town, CHI. TRIB.,June 11, 1993, § 1 (News), at 8 (noting that "many [residents] are
doggeddefenders [sic] of the family's privacy."). The owner of one general store kept
a sign warning tourists, reporters, and other passersby: "No Directions to the
Solzhenitsyn Home." One dairy farmerwho lived near Solzhenitsyn explained: "This
is the way Vermonters are .... If you want to mingle, you mingle. If you don't, you
don't." Id. Admittedly, this example deals with how a group keeps information
secret from outsiders rather than how a group controls distribution of information
within itself. But in either case, I only allude to the fact that privacy norms may be
group-specific. For a discussion of "conspiracies of silence" and their tendency to be
inefficient, see infra note 137.
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inalienability-we maximize the power of norms. Those norms can
then prevent some of the most inefficient disclosures while the love
of gossip ensures that the ATC market failure does not generally
prevent disclosure.
Of course, one might ask why the norms situation cannot be
reversed: Permit blackmail but hope that a norm of disclosure arises
for situations where secrecy is inefficient. The next Section
considers that possibility.
3. Why Disclosure Norms Would Not Equally Correct
the Tendency of a Lawful Blackmail Market
to Produce Excessive Secrecy
If blackmail were legal, norms of disclosure might arise to
ameliorate the problem of excessive secrecy. But disclosure norms
would be less successful at correcting the ATC market failure than
privacy norms are at correcting the inefficiency of the blackmail
ban. The primary reason is that disclosure norms would likely be
weaker than privacy norms. In addition, the state can supplement
norms of privacy or disclosure with direct regulations concerning
the dissemination of information, but laws requiring disclosure
would probably be less effective than laws requiring privacy.
First, recall that an individual violates a norm when b is greater
than P(sc), meaning when the benefit of the violation exceeds the
probability of discovery times the sanction cost one incurs upon
discovery.1 24 Thus, the more an individual benefits from a behav-
ior (an increase in b) and the more easily the behavior is concealed
(a decrease in P), the more difficult it is to enforce a norm against
the behavior. For both reasons, privacy norms will be more
powerful than disclosure norms.
125
On average, the benefit of violating a disclosure norm will be
greater than the benefit of violating a privacy norm. The reason is
the asymmetric transaction costs discussed above: V bears lower
transaction costs in dealing with B than TP does. Thus, V will be
able to offer B higher bribes for violating disclosure norms than TP
will be able to offer for violating privacy norms. In other words, if
blackmail is permitted, V will frequently be willing to pay a
124 See supra part I.A.
"25 Indeed, the argument that follows may understate the comparison in assuming
that comparable disclosure norms even exist. If B's average expected gain from
preserving V's secret is sufficiently high, a norm of disclosure will never arise.
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substantial sum to B to induce his violation of a disclosure norm.
This bribe pits B's norm compliance against his tangible financial
gain. But with a blackmail ban, high transaction costs work against
TP's bribing B to violate privacy norms. Because TPs typically do
not know that the information they seek exists, they face prohibitive
transaction costs in attempting to bribe B to disclose his discovery.
The transaction costs' asymmetry creates an asymmetry in the
benefits of violating norms of privacy and disclosure.
Second, on average, the probability of discovery is greater for
violations of privacy norms than for violations of disclosure norms.
The reason is simply that violations of privacy norms involve
improper disclosure while violations of disclosure norms involve
improper nondisclosure. Disclosure is inherently more public-
more likely to be detected-than nondisclosure. Admittedly, people
may try to disclose anonymously when norms demand silence, but
disclosure of appropriately private information necessarily alerts
group members of the existence of a norm violation. At that point,
what remains unknown is the identity of the violator. However
difficult it may be to identify that person, it is not as difficult as the
detection of disclosure norm violations because nondisclosure does
not necessarily alert anyone of its existence. Instead, norms
obligating disclosure face the unique difficulty that their violation
tends to be a complete secret. If B is the only one who knows of V's
substantive norm violation, the optimal condition for blackmail,
then B faces a very low risk of sanction should he fail to disclose.
Thus, the probability of punishment is higher for violating privacy
norms than it is for violating disclosure norms.
In sum, privacy norms command more compliance than
disclosure norms.12 6 The transaction costs' asymmetry creates an
12c The same comparison holds between privacy norms and norms against
blackmail. One might imagine that, if a group can enforce privacy norms, it can
enforce antiblackmail norms as well. But the existence of privacy norms, some
unsupported by law, does not imply that groups could entirely suppress blackmail
without state sanctions. Even privacy norms are underenforced. See supra note 116.
Absent a legal prohibition, antiblackmail norms would be enforced even less than
privacy norms. Antiblackmail norms are essentially the same as disclosure norms,
refraining from blackmail being the first step toward disclosure. Norms against
blackmail would therefore suffer the same weaknesses: (1) the violation of an
antiblackmail norm tends to be a complete secret, so the probability of detection is
lower than it is for violating privacy norms; (2) given asymmetric transaction costs,
the bribe V offers B to violate an antiblackmail norm (the blackmail price) will, on
average, be greater than the bribe TP pays B to violate a privacy norm. Thus, the
existence of privacy norms unsupported by law does not imply that groups could fully
suppress blackmail without state sanctions. Cf. supra notes 24, 72.
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asymmetry in the benefits of violating norms of privacy and dis-
closure. And the unique difficulty of detecting when someone
withholds a secret creates an assymmetry in the possibility that a
violation of these different norms will be discovered. Because the
benefits from violating disclosure norms are higher and the risk of
detection is lower, B will more frequently violate such norms.
12 7
Thus, the current regime's bundle of legal and norm-based rules
exploits the relative strength of privacy norms. The legal rule
banning blackmail is desirable because it works in tandem with
norms that will command greater compliance than the norms that
arise with a regime of lawful blackmail.
That even privacy norms are underenforced, however, raises another question:
Why does the state not enforce all efficient privacy norms? I will not attempt to
answer this question fully; it is part of a much broader debate over norm governance.
I only note the trivial point that law should not incorporate all norms because of
the administrative costs to enforcing law. The costs of legal enforcement will exceed
the benefits if the stakes involved are low or the norm is too complex and too
dependent on local knowledge. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 8, at 1785-95 (noting
that, because of litigation costs andjudicial error, some contracting parties prefer that
their business norms remain legally unenforceable); Saul Levmore, The Anonymity
Tool, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2191, 2216 (1996) ("We might think of intermediation as
one of many mechanisms that thrive in informal contexts, but that are not easily
formalized."); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms
and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1913, 1932-38 (1996) (arguing
that law should not incorporate the norm of "for cause" dismissals because of
problems of local knowledge). The state does create certain legal obligations
of confidentiality, but does not obligate privacy in every situation where a pri-
vacy norm applies because such norms can be very complex and very dependent on
local knowledge. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. For example,
Robert Post characterizes tort liability for privacy intrusions as incorporating
community norms of "civility." See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy:
Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REv. 957, 1004-08 (1989). But
because of the difficulties in translating "complex, tacit, and contextual territorial
principles" into "the relatively clear, explicit, and precise elements of a formal cause
of action," the tort incorporates only the "most important" community norms. Id. at
975.
'" My argument obviously holds constant the sanction cost the group imposes for
violating either norm. In theory, the higher benefit B receives for violating a
disclosure norm and the lower probability his violation is detected could be offset by
a rise in the sanction cost B bears if his disclosure norm violation is detected. Absent
some theory of perfect homeostasis of norm enforcement, however, this outcome is
excessively optimistic. A more realistic assumption is that sanctioning is costily and
scarce and that a group cannot raise the sanction intensity for one norm without
lowering the sanction intensity for other norms. If blackmail were legal, perhaps a
group would reallocate its norm enforcement capital to raise the sanction cost for
violating disclosure norms above the sanction cost for violating privacy norms. But
given some costs of doing so, the group would probably not completely offset the
change in the other enforcement variables.
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There is a final point that favors privacy norms over disclosure
norms. The state can more effectively supplement privacy norms by
direct regulation. In theory, one could combine a regime of lawful
blackmail with specific laws requiring disclosure of the kind of
information the blackmail regime would otherwise inefficiently
withhold, or one could combine a regime prohibiting blackmail with
specific laws requiring confidentiality of the kind of information
that that regime would otherwise inefficiently disclose. As between
the two, the latter combination is likely to be more effective for the
reason just addressed: Disclosure is inherently more verifiable than
secrecy. Breaches of privacy laws are necessarily more public than
breaches of disclosure laws, and the former is therefore likely to
encourage more compliance than the latter. Consequently, our
existing legal scheme in which blackmail is illegal is supplemented
by various laws protecting privacy.1 21 If these laws accurately
target the kind of information that it is inefficient to disclose, then
the informational outcome is likely to be more efficient than a
regime of legalized blackmail.1 29  A regime banning blackmail,
with privacy norms and privacy laws, might achieve a dissemination
of information close to the optimal level.'
126 Note that many such statutes forbid or create liability for disclosure by institu-
tions that might not be subject to privacy norms. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5
U.S.C. § 522a (1994) (setting requirements for the disclosure of medical, educational,
criminal, and financial information held by agencies of the government); Family Edu-
cation Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (19 94 ) (protecting privacy of student
records); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994) (preventing
disclosure of information about consumers by video tape service providers).
'2 Even with a ban on blackmail, the problem of excessive secrecy may be so great
that the state will sometimes need to require disclosure or provide rewards for
disclosure.
'so There is yet another asymmetry favoring the blackmail ban. Even where the
ban and the lawful blackmail market distribute information identically, there is still
a difference of whether one has to pay for secrecy or disclosure. If blackmail is legal,
Bs will threaten to breach privacy norms unless paid their blackmail price. Vs will
sometimes have to pay for efficient levels of privacy they would otherwise enjoy for
free. The harm in permitting B to extract payments from Vby threatening to violate
an efficient norm is analogous to the harm in permitting B to extract payment from
V by threatening to violate an efficient criminal or tort rule. Such threats cause
wasteful defensive investment of the sort that would occur if the law did not sanction
the actual commission of the crimes and torts. If the privacy norm is efficient,
permitting people to extract payments by threatening to breach the norm is
inefficient. Note the different result for the reverse situation: If we ban blackmail,
TPs will not have to pay for efficient disclosures. Transaction costs make it very
difficult for B to extract payment from TP. Threatening not to gossip about the
subject unless paid invokes the informational bargaining dilemma, where B cannot
fully describe the information he is selling without giving it away. Thus, where
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D. Speculating on the Overall Informational Efficiency
of the Blackmail Ban
Lindgren appears to concede that economic analysis demon-
strates the inefficiency of commercial blackmail, where B invests in
gaining information about V that, after payment, he will not
disclose. Lindgren also appears to concede that economic analysis
demonstrates the inefficiency of opportunistic blackmail in those
cases where B will not gossip: here, permitting blackmail makes V
worse off and wastes the transaction costs necessary to reach a
blackmail agreement. But Lindgren forcefully criticizes the existing
economic theory of blackmail for its failure to justify the ban on
opportunistic blackmail in the many cases where B will gossip: here,
V would prefer having the option of paying blackmail. Banning
blackmail in this situation makes V as well as B worse off. Thus,
Lindgren concludes that the "paradox" of blackmail continues to
confound economic analysis.
This Part supplements the economic theory of blackmail to
respond to Lindgren's criticism. Even assuming B desires to gossip
about his discovery, within close-knit groups, the ban on opportunis-
tic blackmail is likely to improve the distribution of information.
The argument relies on the interests of TP and the greater effi-
ciency of distributing information based on norms rather than based
on the abilities of V and TP to bid against each other for secrecy or
disclosure. The remaining question, however, is whether it is
desirable to ban opportunistic blackmail that occurs outside of close-
knit groups, as where B, V, and TP are all strangers to each other.
Because there may be no norms of privacy in this context, one
might imagine that the ban is inefficient.
disclosure is efficient, B will not be restrained by privacy norms, and he will tend to
gossip. TP will not have to pay to learn what others adventitiously discover.
One might object that when a norm counsels against disclosure, B's threat to
disclose is not credible because B will suffer a cost by disclosing. But some of these
threats will be credible. For example, B may threaten to avoid the norm sanction by
disclosing the secret anonymously. Or, if V can use B's threat to identify him as the
likely source of an anonymous disclosure, B may conceal his identity from V,
anonymously threatening to disclose. In addition, Vmust consider the possibility that
B has miscalculated because, for example, B wrongfully believes that no privacy norm
exists or that, for some reason, his violation will be excused. When the stakes are
high, as will often be the case with private information, even a low risk that B has
miscalculated may make his threat credible. See Daniel Ellsberg, The Theory and
Practice of Blackmail, in BARGAINING: FORMAL THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION 343 (Oran
R. Young ed., 1975) (explaining the success of robbery threats where the victim's
cooperation is required).
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In this final Section, however, I claim that the efficiency of the
ban within close-knit groups is sufficient, in practical terms, to
answer Lindgren's criticism fully. As just stated, the ban on
opportunistic blackmail is clearly efficient if B will not gossip. My
claim is that, outside of close-knit groups, it is probable that B will
not gossip. In other words, Lindgren's criticism depends entirely on
the probability of gossip, and gossip is most likely to occur within
close-knit groups. Thus, the argument of this Part demonstrates the
efficiency of the ban on opportunistic blackmail in precisely the
situation where Lindgren's argument appears to have the greatest
force.
Outside of socially connected groups, the likelihood of gossip is
low. People typically do not gossip about strangers or with
strangers. They enjoy gossiping about people they know with
people they know.' The more familiar V, B, and TP are with one
another, the more plausible it is that B will, absent a blackmail
payment, release the critical information to TP.13 2 The more
probable the gossip, the more likely the group is "close-knit,"
because a defining characteristic of such groups is that members
have a "good supply of information on past and present internal
events."133 To a significant degree then, the groups in which
gossip circulates overlap with the close-knit groups that enforce
norms, so that most of the opportunity for opportunistic blackmail
arises among parties who are subject to common norms. Thus,
Lindgren's claim that Bs gossip about their discoveries of Vs' secrets
to TPs is most forceful precisely where the privacy norms argument
1 See supra note 33.
This is particularly true because, from V's perspective, the "critical information"
is not the substance of his embarrassing behavior or characteristic, but information
identifying him with that behavior or characteristic. B will rarely enjoy passing on
"identity information" to TP if neither he nor TP knows V. Suppose, for example,
that B accidentally discovers that a stranger is having an adulterous affair, is
psychotic, or suffers from a sexual dysfunction. The details of the matter or its
discovery may be interesting and pleasurable to recount. But everyone knows that
adultery, mental disease, and sexual dysfunction exist; unless the listeners know the
subject, his name is neither relevant nor amusing. Including unimportant details in
a story diminishes the pleasure of the recipients and, hence, the teller's pleasure as
well. (Celebrities may present an exception because people like to gossip about
celebrities by name whether or not they personally know them.)
133 ELICKSON, supra note 1, at 181; see also Laing, supra note 17, at 38 ("The more
highly organized or exclusive a group, the more gossip there is within it."); Noon &
Delbridge, supra note 17, at 27 (suggesting that "the extent of gossip may reveal how
tightly knit a community is.... [T]he better integrated the group, the more free the
gossip.").
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of this Part applies.' Where the parties do not belong to a
common group, the odds of gossip diminish substantially, and the
prior argument of other commentators applies: V prefers the ban
because, if blackmail is deterred, B has no reason to disclose or
threaten to disclose; V will enjoy B's silence for free.'
35
Although Lindgren's criticism fails outside of socially connected
groups, that does not necessarily demonstrate that the ban in this
case is efficient. That Vs prefer the blackmail ban does not
complete the analysis, which also depends on the consequences for
TPs. Focusing on adventitious discoveries outside of close-knit
groups, it is probable that TPs will not gain the information whether
or not blackmail is permitted. If blackmail is banned, B will not
gossip with unknown TPs. If blackmail is lawful, V will pay B not to
disclose. Of course, permitting blackmail may change the costs V
incurs for maintaining his secrets."3 6 At this point, however, we
return to the indeterminancies that plague incentive-effect analyses:
It is efficient to maximize the costs of V's secrets in some cases (as
when he is concealing his undiscovered crimes or torts) but
inefficient in others (as when he conceals appropriately private facts
about health or sexuality).'
In addition, the opportunity for V accidentally discovering information about
B probably increases as the interaction between Vand B increases. Thus, the people
most likely to stumble across damaging or embarrassing secrets about Vare members
of V's social groups.
135 See notes 94, 97 and accompanying text. The ban also allows the parties to
reach the same outcome-silence-without incurring bargaining costs.
13" Because we are discussing opportunistic blackmail only, I assume that blackmail
will probably decrease the cost of maintaining secrets. Permitting only opportunistic
blackmail would not raise the investment in information, so it would not affect the
probability of discovery, but V would pay less in blackmail than the costs he would
expect to bear upon full discovery. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
13 Another complication is the existence of "hybrid" cases, in which norms affect
only two of the three parties to a possible blackmail transaction. For example, B may
belong to a group with TP but not V; B may belong to a group with Vbut not TP; or
B may belong to a group with Vand a different group with TP. The second and third
of these cases may give rise to a very important phenomenon-the "conspiracy of
silence." Here, a group enforces an informational norm forbidding disclosure of
negative information about members to nonmembers. Illustrations include
cooperative silence among police, doctors, and crime "families." Such norms are
likely to facilitate group activities that harm the interests of those outside the group,
as where they prevent sanctions for crimes or torts. Thus, conspiracies of silence are
frequently inefficient. (Magicians are an interesting exception; their tricks must be
secret to be entertaining.)
The ban on opportunistic blackmail probably undermines conspiracies of silence.
With a conspiracy, we have a group of people who know each other's secrets and who
benefit, as a whole, from continued silence. The incentive structure is similar to the
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Nonetheless, economic analysis dispels the puzzling or "paradox-
ical" nature of the blackmail ban. The wasteful-investment argu-
ment explains the prohibition on what Lindgren terms commercial
blackmail, where B discovers Vs secret as the fruit of his invest-
ment. A wasteful-transaction cost argument explains the prohibi-
tion on opportunistic blackmail in situations where B would, absent
the blackmail opportunity, not disclose. The existence of norms
explains the ban on opportunistic blackmail within close-knit
groups, where B will gossip unless paid. And gossip is likely to
occur precisely within such groups. One might seek to preserve the
puzzle by claiming that we could define the crime of blackmail to
exclude (and thereby permit) opportunistic blackmail where the
parties are not members of the same close-knit group but where B
would still gossip. But even setting aside the enormous administra-
tive costs of such a rule, there is no clear efficiency gain given the
ambiguous incentive effects of such blackmail. 3 ' At most, one
can say that there is a subset of blackmail, probably small, in which
original prisoner's dilemma, except that repeated future interaction makes silence the
dominant strategy. For this reason, the threat by one conspiracy member to divulge
the secret of another is usually not credible. The group struggles to control
membership and sanctions in a way that ensures such threats remain less than
credible. But occasionally, a member will convince the group that he has nothing to
lose from disclosing, perhaps because he has developed greater loyalty to another
group or because his own secrets have already been discovered. At this point, a
blackmail transaction will permit the group to maintain a conspiracy of silence where
it otherwise would not. The blackmail ban tends to break down the conspiracy of
silence in these cases by facilitating the willingness of these dissident B's to disclose.
The blackmail price paid by the group seeking secrecy will be less than the sanction
the group would pay were the information disclosed. See supra notes 28-32 and
accompanying text. So blackmail would decrease the sanction ultimately imposed on
conspiracies. And for opportunistic blackmail, there is no compensating increase in
the probability of discoveries; if one invests to gain information for blackmail
purposes, then one is no longer engaging in adventitious blackmail. (Nor is
commercial blackmail necessary to undermine such conspiracies because the state or
other organizations can offer more calibrated rewards, as the state does when it
compensates and protects "informants" and "whistleblowers." Cf Shavell, supra note
28, at 1899-1900 (arguing that a reward policy is superior to allowing blackmail of
criminals).)
1" Of course, if one is confident that permitting opportunistic blackmail lowers
the price of maintaining secrets, there would be an efficiency gain from permitting
blackmail only for the kind of secrets we think it is efficient for people to keep
concealed. But imagine the complexity of an exception permitting only (1)
opportunistic blackmail (2) in which the parties are not members of the same close-
knit group (3) but would still gossip (4) about matters that are best kept private.
Although it is best to avoid relying on administrative costs too easily, see supra note
93, at this point they provide a rather obvious basis for preferring a simpler rule
prohibiting all blackmail.
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the gain from criminalization is uncertain. But this conclusion is
hardly startling; given the imprecision of general statutory catego-
ries, the possibility of such imperfections is inevitable.
CONCLUSION
Rational choice analysis suggests several interesting connections
between law and norms. One is the use of law to govern norms.
Where prior scholarship discusses particular norms that legal rules
may strengthen or weaken, this Article identifies the state's
blackmail rule as a means of shaping norms generally. A legal rule
banning or permitting blackmail regulates, among other things, the
conditions under which members of close-knit groups can threaten
to invoke certain norm sanctions, such as shame and reputational
loss. The blackmail ban has ambiguous effects on the expected cost
of violating norms, but more definite effects on the internalization
of norms and the communication processes by which norms are
refined and reformed. By preserving the public nature of norm
enforcement, the ban facilitates both mechanisms. Thus, the state's
decision to ban blackmail is an indirect means of universal norm
governance. Ultimately, the example demonstrates that some
amount of norm governance is inevitable, if only because certain
legal rules will have widespread if unintended consequences for
norms. If the state is to regulate norms intentionally, it should
choose an optimal mix of rules either generally favoring or
disfavoring norms in combination with rules facilitating or obstruct-
ing particular norms.
Rational choice analysis also identifies the conditions under
which law and norms are able to influence individual behavior.
Prior scholarship emphasizes the conditions in which one of these
mechanisms controls behavior to the exclusion of the other, as when
group norms effectively displace legal rules. Blackmail illustrates a
more complex relationship, where law and norms affect behavior
together and where the regulatory choice is between two different
bundles of legal and norm-based rules. In particular, certain
informational norms exist because of our decision to ban blackmail,
but different norms would arise were we to permit blackmail.
Determining the efficient legal rule requires that we compare one
legal rule/norm combination to another.
In this manner, the analysis of group norms, in combination
with existing economic theory, demonstrates that the entire
prohibition of blackmail is efficient, and therefore explicable in
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economic terms. Absent norms, the blackmail ban will produce too
much disclosure. Because of a market failure due to asymmetric
transaction costs, a regime permitting blackmail will produce too
little disclosure. Informational norms work to correct both
inefficiencies, but privacy norms will command more compliance
than disclosure norms. Thus, the legal rule banning blackmail, in
combination with privacy norms, reaches a more efficient distribu-
tion of information than would a lawful blackmail market, in
combination with disclosure norms. By insulating the information-
holder from any monetary influences on his decision to withhold or
disclose the secret, a blackmail ban maximizes the influence of
norms on such decisions. Thus, within close-knit groups the ban is
likely to be efficient, and this turns out to be of pivotal importance
in defending an economic explanation of the blackmail ban.
